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INTRODUCTION
Over three decades after the birth of the All-Volunteer Force and
integration of the service academies, and over a decade since some combat
positions—including aviation and service on warships—were opened to
women, sexual integration of the military continues to be fraught with
1
controversy. Differences in physical strength and in a variety of psychological
characteristics make the sexes differently suited to both combat and non-combat
positions. Apart from these individual differences between men and women,
interpersonal dynamics between men and women can imperil the cohesion of
military units in a number of ways, and the military’s response to these
dynamics can imperil cohesion even more.
The subject of sex—that is, sexual relations—is an integral part of the story
of integration of women into the military. It is a fact of life that, when large
numbers of reproductive-aged men and women are brought together, there will
be a fair amount of sexual behavior, a fair amount of unwanted sexual attention,
and, especially unfortunately, some sexual coercion. The military is not unique
in this respect. The same can be said for, say, universities, corporations, and
bars. A number of attributes of the military present special challenges, however,
including the existence of a formal rank structure, the fact that the military is an
2
inherently masculine enterprise, and the centralized—and often politicized—
mechanisms for responding to sexual issues at the level of the service, the
Department of Defense, and Congress.
As harmful as sexual behavior sometimes can be, the military’s reaction to
it can be even worse. It is fair to say that a characteristic response to sexual
issues by military overseers has been to label men as sexual predators who
require punishment and to label women as victims who require counseling (at
most), irrespective of the willingness with which women participated in the
challenged activities. The military’s reaction to sexual scandals—often driven by
political pressures operating on the military’s civilian leadership and its
congressional overseers—has been a repeated source of military morale
problems.
I. TAILHOOK
Perhaps the “granddaddy” of all military sex scandals was the one arising
out of the September 1991 convention of the Tailhook Association, which was
held at the Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas. The association, which gets its name from
the hook on the rear of a plane that snags the arresting wire on an aircraft-carrier
flight deck, is a private association of active-duty and retired Navy and Marine
3
aviators. Although the 1991 convention has by now acquired the reputation of

1. See generally KINGSLEY BROWNE, CO-ED COMBAT: SHOULD WOMEN FIGHT THE NATION’S
WARS? (forthcoming Nov. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Rowan Scarborough, 10,000 Navy Jobs Cut: The Reason—Tailhook or Politics?, WASH. TIMES,
June 30, 1992, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, 10,000 Navy Jobs Cut].
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an out-of-control fraternity party from Animal House—a reputation not wholly
undeserved—it also served the more serious function of a professional
association, including symposia on aviation issues and providing aviators the
4
opportunity to mingle with their superiors. The events for which the
convention has come to be known were not themselves sponsored by the
Association, but rather by individual members and their flight squadrons. In all,
about 4,000 participants attended this Tailhook convention (the first since the
military’s dazzling success in the 1991 Gulf War), including thirty-two active5
duty Navy admirals and Marine generals.
The story is a familiar one that has been told many times, often being
embellished in the retelling. On Friday and Saturday of the convention,
“hospitality suites” hosted by various flight squadrons were the scene of what
6
can accurately be described as debauchery. The activities included
7
performances by female strippers, sexual interaction with these strippers,
8
drinking “belly/navel shots,” which entails men drinking alcohol out of
9
10
women’s navels, “butt biting” and leg shaving, which are what they sound
like, and “ball walking,” which consisted of fully clothed male officers walking
11
around with their genitals exposed. The activities spread into the third-floor
hall linking the suites. The most infamous of the activities occurred on Saturday
night. A “gauntlet” (or “gantlet”)—a double line of male aviators, one on each
side of the hallway—was set up, and those women who had the fortune or
misfortune, depending upon their preferences, of finding themselves in the
12
hallway were fondled and groped as they walked past the men.
One of those women was Paula Coughlin, an admiral’s aide who claimed
13
that she had been victimized in the gauntlet. Depending upon whose version of
the story is believed, she reported this activity to her boss within a day or a
couple of weeks, and the Chief of Naval Aviation learned of the event sometime
14
shortly after that. Although the convention took place in early September, it
15
did not make the news until late October, at about the same time that the
nation was transfixed by allegations of sexual harassment by Anita Hill against
16
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas.

4. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE TAILHOOK REPORT 15–17 (1993) [hereinafter TAILHOOK
REPORT].
5. Id. at 17, 90.
6. Id. at 25–27.
7. Id. at 74.
8. Id. at 69.
9. Id. at 15–17.
10. Id. at 67–69.
11. Id. at 61–65.
12. Id. at 37–54.
13. Id. at 213–16.
14. GREGORY L. VISTICA, FALL FROM GLORY: THE MEN WHO SANK THE U.S. NAVY 339–40 (1997).
15. John Lancaster, Navy “Gantlet” Probed: Sex Harassment Alleged at Fliers’ Convention, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 1991, at A1.
16. Dan Balz, Thomas Hearings Resonate Across U.S.: Harassment Controversy Highlights Political,
Cultural, Class Divisions, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1991, at A1.
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A. The Reaction
The reaction of the Navy and Congress to the Tailhook mess converted an
out-of-control party into a career-killer for hundreds of Navy personnel and a
morale-killer for thousands of others. The Navy’s initial response was to assign
investigatory responsibility to its Inspector General and the Naval Investigative
Service. This investigation turned up many incidents of inappropriate behavior
but little in the way of identifiable suspects. Few women were able to identify
their assailants, and few of the men attending the convention provided useful
information. Although some attributed the aviators’ reticence to a conspiracy,
Jean Zimmerman suggests that no conspiracy was even necessary. Most of these
aviators had gone through Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”)
training, she argues, and were well-versed in ways to avoid providing useful
17
information to interrogators. The failure of the investigation to produce
suspects to match the lurid facts it uncovered led to charges of “cover-up.” Navy
Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett, III, resigned and was replaced by Sean O’Keefe
18
as Acting Secretary, who was quick to announce that “we get it.”
The political reaction to the case—and to the perceived Navy cover-up—
was intense. The Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep.
John Murtha—who has more recently earned a measure of fame for his call for
immediate withdrawal from Iraq—announced that his subcommittee was
19
cutting 10,000 Navy jobs in retaliation for the Navy’s handling of the scandal.
The Senate Armed Services Committee put a hold on promotions of about 4,500
Navy and Marine Corps officers until it could be determined which ones were
20
associated with the Tailhook convention.
Advocates of an expanded combat role for women seized on Tailhook to
argue—somewhat irrationally, if one thinks about it—that the scandal proved
the necessity of placing women into combat positions. Opening such positions
to women would result in their receiving greater respect from their male
colleagues, they argued, making women’s abuse at the hands of their colleagues
21
less likely. Others drew the opposite conclusion, asking how women are going
to stand up to the enemy if they require intervention of Congress and the
22
Pentagon to protect them from their peers. As one columnist suggested, “If a
grown woman can’t handle some friendly drunks in a public place, then she’s
hardly qualified to command men in the much more serious and stressful
23
environment of war.” Or, as Elaine Donnelly of the Center for Military
Readiness put it, the argument is that “military women must be exposed to

17. JEAN ZIMMERMAN, TAILSPIN: WOMEN AT WAR IN THE WAKE OF TAILHOOK 67–79 (1995).
18. Melissa Healy, Pentagon Blasts Navy’s Tailhook Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at A1.
19. Scarborough, 10,000 Navy Jobs Cut, supra note 3.
20. Id.
21. Letta Tayler, Operation Parity: Assaults Renew Debate on Role of Women, NEWSDAY, July 27,
1992, at 6.
22. John Lancaster, Reports of Sexual Assaults Add Fuel to Debate over Women in Combat: Partisans
on Both Sides Find Ammunition in Tailhook, Other Incidents, WASH. POST, July 14, 1992, at A3.
23. Charley Reese, Women in Navy Should Handle Their Own Personal Problems, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 7, 1992, at A8.
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thugs behind enemy lines in order to protect them from drunken comrades at
24
home.”
Make no mistake: The third floor of the Hilton Hotel was not a place one
would like his daughter, his wife, his girlfriend, his sister, or his mother to be
(or, for that matter, his son, his brother, or his father). Unquestionably, sexual
misconduct occurred that reflected poorly on the Navy and, at a minimum,
warranted administrative punishment of some of the participants. The
investigation, however, went far beyond any reasonable bounds. The approach
of the Navy and of its congressional overseers was to view all complaints as
well-founded, all of the women involved as victims (whether or not they viewed
themselves that way), and all of the men who attended the convention (and
many who did not) as oppressors of women.
B. The Pentagon Inspector General’s Investigation
Dissatisfaction with the Navy IG’s investigation led to assignment of
investigatory responsibility to the Department of Defense Inspector General,
25
with the investigation being headed by Deputy IG Derek J. Vander Schaaf. It
was clear from the outset that the Pentagon Inspector General’s Office had no
taste for the kind of accusations of cover-up that sank Secretary Garrett. The
Pentagon IG’s investigation and subsequent Navy prosecutions were often—
26
27
and not unfairly—compared to “witch hunts,” “inquisitions,” and “Star
28
Chamber” proceedings.
The Inspector General’s report identified 140 Navy and Marine officers,
29
eighty-three female victims, and seven male victims, although the male
“victims”—even ones who claimed to have been subjected to sexual groping by
women—were never mentioned again. The investigation clearly demonstrated
that the IG was more concerned about avoiding criticism for being too lax than
avoiding criticism for being unfair. In Paula Coughlin’s later civil trial against
the Hilton, the judge refused to allow the IG report to be admitted, finding that
it was “largely conclusory and based on hearsay and double hearsay indicating
30
its lack of trustworthiness.” One need not feel too sorry for Coughlin, however,
as she was awarded $6.7 million by the jury (reduced by the judge to $5.2

24. Elaine Donnelly, The Tailhook Scandals: How the Navy’s Sexual Harassment Investigation Case
Was Mishandled, NAT’L REV., Mar. 7, 1994, at 59.
25. Bill Gertz, 140 Implicated in Tailhook Report: Navy Leadership “Breakdown” Cited, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter Gertz, 140 Implicated].
26. Rowan Scarborough, Open Season on Navy: Scandal Gives Hill Ammunition, WASH. TIMES, July
20, 1992, at A1.
27. Philip Gold, This Is Not the Navy I Knew . . . but it Was Adm. Boorda’s Navy, WASH. TIMES, May
21, 1996, at A15.
28. Paul C. Roberts, Military Loyalties vs. Sexual Politics, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at A16.
29. Gertz, 140 Implicated, supra note 25.
30. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Report Barred at Civil Trial: Pentagon Probe “Not Trustworthy,”
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1994, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Tailhook Report Barred].
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million), in addition to the $400,000 paid by the Tailhook Association to settle
31
the case against it.
Inspector General investigators engaged in conduct that can only be called
abusive. Many officers were subjected to questions about whether they
masturbated and the kind of sex they engaged in with their wives or girlfriends.
Others were falsely told that a colleague had implicated them in misconduct, a
common interrogation technique in civilian law enforcement but a dangerous
one to use in a widespread fishing expedition among comrades in arms. Sowing
the seeds of distrust among squadron-mates is a perilous course, and the
technique contributed to the low morale already created by the investigation. As
one Marine flier said,
When you’re in combat, you depend on a lot of people, and one thing you don’t
want is people who might have to save you thinking you might be doing
something behind their back. It’s very dangerous to play people off of each
32
other who rely on each other in combat.

Of course, the Tailhook investigation and the subsequent rush to put women in
combat positions were never about military effectiveness.
C. The Navy Prosecutions
The Pentagon IG then passed the baton to the Navy for prosecution.
Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations, placed Admiral J. Paul
Reason in charge of Navy prosecutions and Major General Charles Krulak (later
33
Commandant of the Marine Corps) in charge of Marine prosecutions. The
Navy’s approach to prosecutions turned out to be as heavy-handed as the IG’s
approach to investigations.
1. Paula Coughlin: The Victim’s Face
The poster girl for the Tailhook case was Paula Coughlin herself, “Victim
34
Number 50” in the Inspector General’s report. She alleged that she had come
onto the third floor of the hotel on Saturday night and was immediately pulled
into the gauntlet, and that men were groping her and trying to take off her
panties. She says that she twice bit her primary attacker, who had grabbed her
from behind, believing that she had drawn blood. She then was able to escape.
Coughlin subsequently picked out the picture of a Marine from a
photographic array, identifying him as her attacker. The only problem was that
the Marine pictured was a “ringer”—someone who had not attended the
Tailhook convention. After being tipped off that the person she had identified
had not even been at the convention, she then picked Marine Captain Gregory

31. Patricia Brennan, “She Stood Alone: The Tailhook Scandal”: Did They Get Away with It?, WASH.
POST, May 21, 1995, at Y7.
32. Rowan Scarborough, Morale Shot down by Tailhook Probe: Fliers Humiliated by Sex Questions,
WASH. TIMES, March 22, 1993, at A1.
33. Gertz, 140 Implicated, supra note 25.
34. TAILHOOK REPORT, supra note 4, at 213–16.
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35

Bonam out of a line-up. He had been wearing a burnt-orange shirt, she
claimed. Unfortunately for Coughlin, pictures from the event showed that
36
Bonam had been wearing a green shirt with a distinctive pattern. Moreover,
Bonam had no scar on his arm, as would have been expected from Coughlin’s
description of the ferocity of her bite, and Bonam had alibi witnesses who placed
37
him on the hotel terrace at the time of the attack. Also, a civilian witness had
described Coughlin’s assailant as being about five-foot-four, about nine inches
38
shorter than Capt. Bonam. None of this evidence was enough to spare Bonam
from the efforts of Navy prosecutors, however.
It also turned out that Coughlin had been a willing participant in some of
the “wrongful” activities. She claimed that her visit to the third floor on
Saturday night had been her first. On Friday night, she asserted, she had been in
39
her hotel room all evening, going to bed around 9 p.m. However, she was
placed on the third floor on Friday night by the sworn testimony of four
witnesses, including two female pilots, one of whom had lobbied alongside
Coughlin on Capitol Hill for repeal of the ban on women flying in combat
missions. According to one of the female pilots, she saw Coughlin getting her
legs shaved. It caught her eye because “she was in her uniform, in her whites,
and she had bare legs, you know, no hose on, and she had her skirt, you know,
40
hiked up fairly high.” Although this pilot attempted to tell investigators from
the Inspector General’s office about Coughlin’s activities, she said that they were
not interested in hearing anything negative about Coughlin.
Indeed, it was established Defense Department policy that the investigation
would not include misconduct by female officers, and even when eyewitness
41
accounts were provided to investigators, they took no action. For example, Lt.
42
Rolando Diaz—nicknamed “the Barber of Seville” —had told IG investigators
that he had shaved Coughlin’s legs and that she had shown her appreciation by
signing a banner, “You made me see God. The Paulster.” Despite Diaz’s
statements and the banner bearing her signature, which the IG had in its
possession, the IG claimed not to have received any direct evidence that
43
Coughlin had participated in any misconduct. Although neither Coughlin nor
any other woman whose legs he shaved was subjected to any discipline, Lt. Diaz
faced a court-martial that could have resulted in a prison term and dismissal
from the Navy. Before trial, he agreed to accept a non-judicial punishment,

35. Bill Gertz, Tailhook Defense Cites “Irregular” Investigation, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at A3.
36. Rowan Scarborough, Corps Urged to Drop Weak Tailhook Case, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at
A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Corps Urged to Drop].
37. Bill Gertz, Tailhook Suspect Calls ID Mistaken: Marine Flier Disputes Accuser’s Tale, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at A1.
38. Scarborough, Corps Urged to Drop, supra note 36.
39. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Accuser Is Suing the Hotel: Witnesses Counter Coughlin’s Claims,
WASH. TIMES, July 11, 1994, at A1.
40. Id.
41. Scarborough, Tailhook Report Barred, supra note 30.
42. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 17, at 3.
43. TAILHOOK REPORT, supra note 4, at 215.
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which could result in a fine or letter of reprimand but spare him from the court44
martial.
45
The claim that Coughlin “unwittingly” stumbled onto the third floor that
Saturday night simply appears to be false. Her presence on Friday night
indicates that she had reason to know what was going on. Any notion that
Coughlin was a shrinking violet is also dispelled by statements by a former
boyfriend given to the staff of Admiral Kelso indicating that she had shown up
at a Navy “dining-in party” wearing “black fishnet panty hose, high heels, a
46
short black miniskirt, a black tuxedo jacket and carrying a large rubber dildo.”
Given her prevarication, it is small wonder that she later complained that she
47
was ostracized by her fellow aviators.
The double standard applied to male and female misconduct in the
Tailhook affair was palpable. The IG Report specifically noted that “many
women freely and knowingly participated in gauntlet activities . . . and seemed
48
to enjoy the attention and interaction with the aviators.” They were “smiling
and giggling” and some went through the line numerous times. Yet none of the
Navy women involved were censured for their participation. As military
sociologist Charles Moskos observed, “no female officer who misbehaved was
reprimanded or sanctioned, sending a terrible message to the fleet, meaning
49
women were held to a different standard.”
2. Cole Cowden and Elizabeth Warnick
A particularly egregious case involved Navy Lt. Cole Cowden, who was
prosecuted for sexual assault and for conduct unbecoming an officer. One
charge, which dated back to the 1990 Tailhook convention, involved a claim by
Navy Lt. Elizabeth Warnick that Cowden, along with two other men, had
forcibly sexually assaulted her by pushing her down on a bed, removing her
panties, and grabbing her genitals in an attempt to gang rape her. Warnick also
complained that she had been receiving threatening telephone calls from
California, where Cowden had been stationed at the time; that someone had
slashed the tires on her car; and that she had received a bouquet of roses with a
death threat. Another charge against Cowden was based on a picture showing a
civilian nurse pulling his face against her clothed breast.
Warnick later admitted under oath that she had lied about the attempted
50
gang rape. She had concocted the story because she had had consensual sex

44. William H. McMichael, Navy Officer Avoids Court-Martial: Flier Agrees to Non-Judicial
Punishment in Tailhook Case, SUN-SENTINEL (S. Fla.), Sept. 25, 1993, at 3A.
45. Dana Priest, Conduct Unbecoming: In the Navy, Sexual Harassment Has Reached Titanic
Proportions, PLAYBOY, July 1996, at 64.
46. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 356.
47. Kenneth B. Noble, Woman Tells of Retaliation for Complaint on Tailhook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1994, at A18.
48. TAILHOOK REPORT, supra note 4, at 42.
49. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Army Heeds the Lessons of Tailhook: Quick Response Averts Suspicion of
Cover-Up, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 1996, at 1A.
50. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Witness Told Lies: Navy, IG Knew, Still Sought Trial, WASH.
TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Tailhook Witness].
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with Cowden and was afraid that her fiancé would find out. She also admitted
51
that the stories about threats and vandalism were false. Much of Warnick’s
story was apparently intended to deflect attention from her own misconduct at
the 1991 convention. When IG investigators first contacted her, she had been
identified by six officers as having taken part in the leg shaving and “belly
52
shots.” She apparently thought—correctly, as it turned out—that playing the
victim would spare her conduct from scrutiny.
After Warnick’s story fell apart, the hearing officer recommended dropping
the other charge against Cowden because the nurse had told investigators that
53
the contact was consensual and she did not consider herself a victim. When the
Navy prosecutor concurred, expressing ethical objections to continuing the
prosecution, Captain Jeffry Williams, Admiral Reason’s senior legal officer,
removed the Navy prosecutor from the case and advised Admiral Reason to
continue with the prosecution. Captain William Vest, Jr., the judge presiding
over the Tailhook prosecutions in Norfolk, Virginia, ultimately removed
Williams from the case, finding that Williams had deceived and badgered
Cowden and declaring that Williams had “become too personally involved in
the prosecution” and had “exceeded the permissible bounds of his official role
54
as legal adviser.” The charge against Cowden was subsequently dropped after
review by a specially appointed lawyer.
The most serious wrongdoing in the Cowden story was Warnick’s false
charge of sexual assault, but she apparently received little, if any, discipline. Yet
her attempt to destroy the careers of fellow officers by false accusations of a
serious felony was far more calculated than the exuberance that characterized
most of the Tailhook activities. Warnick’s story is an example of the inaccuracy
of the fashionable contention that when women allege sexual assault, “they are
55
almost always telling the truth.”
3. Robert Stumpf
One of the most well-known casualties of Tailhook was Commander
Robert Stumpf. Commander of the Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (“Blue
Angels”), Stumpf was a superstar F/A-18 pilot, decorated for heroism in the
Gulf War. Stumpf attended the convention to receive an award for the best
fighter/attack squadron of the year. His Tailhook sin appears to have been
being present in a hospitality suite where a stripper was performing. Because
Stumpf had to fly home early the next morning, he went back to his room to go

51. United Press International, Tailhook Defendant Rails at Accusers, July 16, 1993.
52. Id.; Scarborough, Tailhook Witness, supra note 50.
53. William H. McMichael, Navy Drops Charges Against Tailhook Officer: The Decision Raises
Doubts about the Navy’s Ability to Successfully Prosecute Other Officers Implicated in the Scandal,
NEWPORT NEWS DAILY PRESS, Sept. 21, 1993, at A4; Eric Schmitt, Navy Drops Case of Tailhook Flier,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at A14.
54. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Removes Navy’s Top Legal Adviser, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1993, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Removes].
55. ERIN SOLARO, WOMEN IN THE LINE OF FIRE: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY 325 (2006).
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to bed. After he left, the stripper apparently performed oral sex on one of the
remaining officers.
Stumpf was relieved of his duties after the Inspector General’s report
indicated that he had been present at the time of the “lewd act.” After a weeklong hearing five months later, however, the Navy cleared him of any
56
wrongdoing, and he was allowed to rejoin the Blue Angels. According to his
lawyer, the Inspector General knew about a witness who could clear Stumpf,
but they had not bothered to interview him.
Stumpf was subsequently up for promotion to captain and assignment as a
carrier air-wing commander, a dream job for a naval aviator. The promotion was
delayed, however, when the Senate Armed Services Committee learned of his
Tailhook involvement, and the Secretary of the Navy removed Stumpf’s name
57
from the promotion list.
The Navy then began yet another in the series of investigations into
Stumpf’s conduct to determine whether his promotion should once again be
forwarded to the Senate. However, the hostile and adversarial nature of that
proceeding led Stumpf to conclude that the Navy was simply trying to justify
not promoting him. Stumpf announced his retirement, effective October 1996,
complaining that “the conduct of the last of nine investigations convinced me
58
that the promotion was no longer going to be supported.”
Stumpf was ultimately exonerated, although most of the harm he suffered
could not be undone. In 2002, the Navy concluded that “an injustice has resulted
59
in not promoting [Stumpf] to the grade of captain.” Although the promotion
entitled Stumpf—then flying cargo jets for FedEx—to back pay for the difference
between a commander and a captain’s pay, it could not restore to him the dream
of being carrier air-wing commander. Stumpf expressed the hope that “this is
the beginning of a measured re-examination of the injustices accorded to
hundreds of naval officers whose promising careers were terminated
prematurely during the shameful political hysteria following the 1993
60
investigations.”
4. Other Victims of Prosecutorial Overreaching
Cole Cowden and Robert Stumpf were far from the only officers seemingly
unfairly targeted by prosecutors. Consider Lt. Mike Bryan, who, while on his
way to get a hot dog, spent about five minutes on the third-floor hallway where

56. Rowan Scarborough, Blue Angels Chief Is Cleared in Tailhook, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at A1
[hereinafter Scarborough, Blue Angels Chief Cleared].
57. Rowan Scarborough, Navy Chief Reverses: Won’t Promote Pilot Cleared in Tailhook, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at A7.
58. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Officer Gives up Fight for Promotion, Retires: Navy Officials
Relieved That Battle Is Over, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 1996, at A3.
59. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Scandal “Injustice” Righted: Retired Officer to Get Promotion,
WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1.
60. Id.
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61

women were groped later that night. A promising aviator, he was one of just a
few given the opportunity to make the transition from the discontinued A-6
Intruder to the F/A-18 Hornet. Although no one—not the Inspector General, the
Navy, nor anyone present at the convention—accused Bryan of any misconduct,
the Senate Armed Services Committee blocked his promotion to Lieutenant
62
Commander, although it declined to say exactly why.
The “hold” on his promotion derailed Bryan’s career. During the pendency
of the investigations, Bryan was mostly relegated to desk work, so he had fallen
too far behind in the career competition with other aviators ever to catch up.
“I’ve slid so long I’m completely off track with my career,” he complained.
Frustrated with the long delay that was putting him farther and farther behind,
he resigned in early 1997. The Navy’s response was to demand that he return
$10,000 in a re-signing bonus before allowing him to join a Navy reserve unit,
despite the fact that he had remained in the Navy to fly, which the Navy was
not allowing him to do.
The demand for return of Bryan’s bonus—although ultimately
63
withdrawn —stands in contrast to the treatment of Paula Coughlin, who was
allowed to keep $18,600 in unearned retention bonus despite her resignation
64
over four years prior to the end of her commitment. This unprecedented
exception was approved by Navy Secretary John Dalton, and it was the only
time to date that the Navy had allowed an aviator departing early voluntarily to
keep a signing bonus. The stated reason was that her case was special because
she was resigning due to the stress of Tailhook and its aftermath. She had,
however, signed her contract eight months after the Tailhook convention, which
is the event that she claimed during her civil trial against the Hilton caused her
“post-traumatic stress.”
Consider also the case of Commander Gregory Tritt, an EA-6B Prowler
anti-radar jet pilot. A hearing judge had recommended dismissal of charges
against him, the most serious of which was indecent assault against a female
ensign who had failed to pick him out of a lineup or to identify him at a pretrial
hearing. Admiral Reason overruled the recommendation to dismiss and ordered
the court-martial to proceed, despite the fact that no victim had identified Tritt
65
as being present. The final charge of “conduct unbecoming an officer” (for
failure to stop the misconduct of others) was finally dropped when Captain
William Vest threw out the charges against Tritt and the remaining Tailhook
66
defendants. Tritt was told that he could return to his job, but facing $100,000 in

61. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Red Tape Drives Pilot Out: Navy Demands Return of Bonus,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1997, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Scandal Casts Long Shadow: Brings
Promising Careers to Their End, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at A9.
62. Rowan Scarborough, Lawmakers Ease Tailhook Promotions: Panel Also Orders Process to Help
Officers Answer Charges, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at A1.
63. John Fritz, Denied Promotion, Navy Pilot Quits, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 10, 1997, at B1.
64. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Whistleblower to Keep Retention Bonus, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1994, at A1.
65. Rowan Scarborough, Only 3 Assault Cases in Tailhook Scandal, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at
A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Only 3 Assault Cases].
66. See infra text accompanying 78.
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debt to his lawyers and having been absent from his squadron for six months
while fighting the criminal charges—with the attendant loss of competitive
67
position—Tritt retired a month after the charges were dismissed.
D. The End Result of the Navy Process
Despite the zeal of Navy prosecutors (or perhaps partly because of it), the
Navy’s prosecutions resulted in not a single conviction. Of the 140 cases referred
by the IG for disciplinary action, a majority of them (and almost all of the most
serious ones) were dropped due to insufficient evidence. Twenty-eight cases
were dealt with by Admiral Reason at non-judicial “admiral’s masts,” with
sanctions generally being limited to fines, reprimands, and some non-punitive
68
actions.
Some interpreted the failure of the prosecutions as more evidence of coverup rather than as a product of weak cases and prosecutorial over-reaching.
Frank Rich of the New York Times asserted: “The scandal has been swept under
the Navy’s rug—140 marauding Navy and Marine pilots; 83 assaulted women; 0
69
Courts-Martial.” It is doubtful in the extreme that the officers who faced
charges and investigations—who suffered serious and sometimes fatal career
damage—believed that the scandal was being swept under the rug. According
70
to a PBS report, Tailhook terminated or damaged the careers of fourteen
71
admirals and almost 300 naval aviators. The report might have added that it
made naval aviation an unpleasant place to be for thousands of others and led to
72
an exodus of aviators from the Navy.
Far from wishing to protect the accused officers, the mindset of much of the
naval prosecution was to get them at all costs. In the words of one Tailhook
defense lawyer, a former Marine Corps prosecutor, “Anybody who said they
were a victim, their words were taken as gospel, and anybody who happened to
wear wings was a culprit. The insanity of this whole thing is a substantial
percentage of people . . . identified as victims didn’t regard themselves as
73
victims.”

67. Rowan Scarborough, Cleared but Tainted: Tailhook Defendant Decides to Leave Navy, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at A1.
68. Rowan Scarborough, Navy Judge Says Kelso Lied in Tailhook Probe: Rebukes Admiral, Dismisses
Last 3 Cases, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Navy Judge Says Kelso Lied].
69. Frank Rich, Journal: The Girl next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, § 4, at 13.
70. Frontline: The Navy Blues: Tailhook ’91 (PBS television broadcast Oct. 16, 1996).
71. PBS, Frontline: The Navy Blues: Tailhook ’91: Post Tailhook Punishment,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/navy/tailhook/disc.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2007); see also Frontline: The Navy Blues: Tailhook ’91 (PBS television broadcast Oct. 15. 1996)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/navy/script.html).
72. Robert Stumpf, Problems with Pilot Retention in the Post-Tailhook Armed Forces, Remarks at the
Center for Military Readiness Conference at the U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1998)
(transcript on file with author), cited in Kingsley R. Browne, Women at War: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 51, 199 n.761 (2001).
73. Rowan Scarborough, Politics Blamed for Flaws in Tailhook Probe, Cases, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1994, at A3 [hereinafter Scarborough, Politics Blamed].
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Admiral Reason, who headed the Tailhook prosecutions, had actually
attempted to prevent the accused flyers from defending themselves at all. He
urged that the Secretary of Navy issue unusual “letters of censure” against six
officers, including Robert Stumpf. Unlike a court-martial or even an admiral’s
mast, a career-ending letter of censure does not give the accused officer an
opportunity to defend himself. Admiral Stanley Arthur rejected this request and
ordered that Reason either prosecute the accused officers or dismiss the
74
charges.
The judicial response to the behavior and investigatory tactics of the
Inspector General and Navy prosecutors was harsh. Military judge Commander
Larry McCullough wrote in an opinion that IG investigators “were heavyhanded and possibly abusive in their treatment of junior officers whom they
75
questioned.” Captain Vest, the judge who ultimately dismissed the last charges
of the Tailhook charges because of Navy misconduct, described the conduct of
IG investigators as a “novice approach to criminal investigation [that] resulted
76
in the wholesale repudiation of reports by many of the witnesses.” The U.S.
Court of Military Appeals described the attempts by IG investigators and Navy
prosecutors to implicate others as “reflect[ing] a most curiously careless and
amateurish approach to a very high-profile case by experienced military lawyers
and investigators. At worst, it raises the possibility of a shadiness in respecting
77
the rights of military members.”
Three Navy prosecutors were removed by the judge for inappropriate and
78
overzealous conduct. By contrast, it will be recalled, the Navy removed a
prosecutor from the prosecution of Cole Cowden for not being sufficiently
overzealous, as reflected in his expressed reservations about continuing the
prosecution after Elizabeth Warnick admitted that she had lied and the hearing
79
officer had recommended dismissal of all charges.
The final act in the criminal prosecutions was written by Captain Vest,
when he dismissed charges against the remaining three officers. He ruled that
Admiral Frank Kelso had a fatal conflict of interest that tainted all of the
prosecutions. Admiral Kelso had been present at the Tailhook convention,
although he denied having been present for any of the sexual misconduct. A
number of witnesses challenged his account, however, and Captain Vest
80
concluded that Admiral Kelso had lied. He also concluded that Kelso had
manipulated “the initial investigative process and the subsequent [adjudication]
process in a manner designed to shield his personal involvement.” Among other
things, Captain Vest concluded, the Admiral had excluded from the charge of
the Naval Investigative Service the conduct of flag-rank officers and had taken

74. See Scarborough, Blue Angels Chief Cleared, supra note 56.
75. Scarborough, Politics Blamed, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Fires Prosecutor for Misconduct, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1994, at A3.
79. Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Removes, supra note 54.
80. Scarborough, Navy Judge Says Kelso Lied, supra note 68, at A1.
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custody of all Tailhook files on the flag officers who attended the convention,
including his own. Captain Vest ruled that in light of his conflict of interest,
Kelso’s naming of Admiral Reason warranted dismissal of the last three charges
in Tailhook.
During the course of the Tailhook proceedings, Admiral Kelso had
modified his opposition to women’s service on combat ships, a turnaround that
81
many attributed to his desire to keep his job. After Captain Vest’s stinging
rebuke, Admiral Kelso sought to retire two months before his term as CNO was
over. Kelso’s decision to retire provoked an acrimonious fight in the Senate over
whether he would be allowed to retire with his four stars or lose two of them, as
the Senate must confirm the retirements of all three- and four-star officers; if it
does not, they retire with just two stars. By a narrow 53–46 vote, with all seven
of the Senate’s women voting against him, Kelso was allowed to keep his four
82
stars.
E. Unlawful Command Influence
The unfairness to the Tailhook accused resulted in part from characteristics
of the military judicial process. Military prosecutions face a special challenge,
one that many in Congress were either ignorant of or simply insensitive to. The
problem is command influence. In the civilian world, the Justice Department, a
part of the Executive Branch, prosecutes federal criminal cases. The cases are
heard by federal judges, who are representatives of the Judicial Branch. These
judges have “life tenure,” insulating them to a very large extent from political
pressures. In the military, however, almost all of the players are military
83
personnel in the military chain of command. Thus, in the Tailhook cases, the
decision to prosecute was made by the “convening authority”—Admiral Reason
84
in the Navy prosecutions, who was named by Admiral Kelso. The prosecutors
were Navy officers from the JAG corps, and the judges and jurors were also
Navy officers. If the accused did not hire a civilian lawyer—though many did—
then his defense lawyer was also a Navy officer. The Navy chain of command
goes up through the uniformed ranks, to the Secretary of the Navy, to the
Secretary of Defense, and ultimately to the President—the Commander in Chief.
In the Tailhook scandal, there were many indicia of inappropriate
command influence, starting at the top. After Paula Coughlin went public with
her accusations, she was invited to meet with President George H.W. Bush and
First Lady Barbara Bush and was given their sympathy. Congress was on the

81. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 373; Editorial, Frightened Chiefs, Abandoned Troops, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1993, at A4 (suggesting that Admiral Kelso had “become a pathetic caricature, so eager to
retain his brass buttons and silk stripes that he would buy his uniforms at Victoria’s Secret if Patsy
Schroeder suggested it”).
82. Rowan Scarborough, Women Foes Aside, Senate Votes Kelso 4-Star Retirement, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1994, at A3.
83. Frederic I. Lederer & Barbara H. Zeliff, Needed: An Independent Military Judiciary: A Proposal
to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in EUGENE R. FIDELL & DWIGHT H. SULLIVAN, EVOLVING
MILITARY JUSTICE 27, 28 (2002).
84. Scarborough, Tailhook Witness Told Lies, supra note 50.
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warpath, putting pressure on the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and on the
Navy brass. It was abundantly clear to the players all along the chain of
command that the higher-ups wanted heads to roll, as revealed in the prescient
prediction of retired Rear Admiral John Gordon, former Navy Judge Advocate
General, who was relieved of duty for his part in the initial Navy investigation
85
and who had retired shortly thereafter. Even before the Inspector General
issued his report, Admiral Gordon predicted:
It is now clear to all that the [Inspector General] has absolutely no standard for
its reporting and is primarily interested in the political outcome, not the facts. I
truly believe that the command-influence problem created by our political
leadership is so severe that we will not see one successful court-martial come of
86
this process.

The result of this command-influence problem was a series of ham-fisted
prosecutions, apparently produced by a desire to garner favor from those higher
in the chain of command. It is hardly a surprise, then, that those facing charges
often felt betrayed by their leadership.
The fact that mistakes were made in the Tailhook investigation does not
mean that those who engaged in misconduct should not have been held
accountable. Major mistakes were inevitable, however, once the alleged
misconduct came to be viewed as the moral equivalent of capital crimes. A
critical failure of perspective resulted primarily from pressure by Congress, with
the gleeful and at times prurient encouragement of the press. Because the case
was always as much about women serving in combat positions as it was about
sexual abuse, there was no way that it could have a happy ending for the
accused. The investigation was never really about the individual guilt or
innocence of the accused, but rather about the collective guilt of the institution
for failing to incorporate women fully. The political pressure paid off. Before the
scandal and its aftermath were over, the ban on women serving on warships
87
and flying combat aircraft had been lifted.
The misbehavior of Navy and Marine personnel at Tailhook—
predominantly, but not exclusively, engaged in by men—was inappropriate,
and in a few instances probably criminal. Problems of that nature—although
perhaps not to that extent—are entirely foreseeable, even if not inevitable, when
high-spirited young men and women are brought together. As the Tailhook
investigation revealed, many women were voluntary and eager participants.
Although Tailhook is the best known of the scandals, as will be seen below,
it was merely the smash “opening act” for a host of similar events.

85. Melissa Healy, Wide Range of Victims in Wake of Tailhook Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at
A1.
86. Scarborough, Politics Blamed, supra note 73.
87. John Lancaster, Nearly All Combat Jobs To Be Open to Women: Front-Line Ground Units Would
Be Excluded, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1993, at A1.
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II. BEYOND TAILHOOK
Tailhook was justly characterized as “the worst catastrophe for the Navy
88
since Pearl Harbor.” Indeed, a strong case could be made that it caused more
long-lasting damage to the Navy than the 1941 attack, despite the fact that the
Japanese attack killed over 2,400 people and destroyed a substantial part of the
U.S. fleet. Within a year after Pearl Harbor, the Navy had come back stronger
than before the attack, and in less than four years, it had utterly destroyed the
Japanese navy. Four years after Tailhook, by contrast, the Navy was still reeling,
and some of the harm it inflicted lingers on a decade and a half later.
The harm of Tailhook came primarily in the form of damage to the prestige
of the institution, to the careers of hundreds—if not thousands—of Navy and
Marine personnel, and to the morale of the entire service, especially the aviation
community. To the extent that integration of women into combat roles is viewed
negatively—a subject about which there is obviously debate—that is another
cost of Tailhook, as is the difficulty of even having a reasoned debate on the
subject.
Tailhook was in some ways the beginning—although there had been
“mini” scandals even before—but it was surely not the end. Rather, it was the
harbinger of much that was to come. It made the civilian and military leadership
exquisitely sensitive to any claim that had anything at all to do with sex, and it
went far toward purging the military of the “warrior” mentality.
A. The Navy in the Aftermath of Tailhook
One of the most significant results of Tailhook was the Navy’s resultant
mad dash to place women into combat positions. The Navy put on a full-court
press to get women through aviation training, even, it appears, in circumstances
89
in which men would wash out. The result was a widespread perception that
women were simply not allowed to fail and that attempting to impose standards
on women could be career suicide.
When Admiral Frank Kelso retired in 1994, he was replaced as Chief of
Naval Operations by Admiral Jeremy (“Mike”) Boorda. Admiral Boorda was to
hold that position for a scant two years, until his suicide in 1996. The ostensible
reason for his suicide was that he had been wearing “combat V’s” on two of his
ribbons that he was not entitled to wear, but there is much speculation that
Tailhook, and the timidity—if not outright cowardice—that it instilled in the
Navy leadership, played a major role.
An important thread in the Boorda saga began with a sexual-harassment
charge filed by Lt. (j.g.) Rebecca Hansen, a helicopter-pilot trainee at Corpus
Christi, Texas. She alleged in 1992 that one of her flight instructors had sexually
harassed her both physically and verbally. The Navy investigated, and it

88. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 15.
89. Becky Garrison, Female Aviator’s Flying in Question: Squadronmate of Hultgreen Subject of
Investigation Aboard Carrier, NAVY TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 10; Becky Garrison, Internal Report Confirms
Hultgreen’s Error, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at 3.
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confirmed the charges of verbal harassment but not those of physical
90
harassment, and the accused harasser was discharged from the service.
After completing ground school in Texas, Hansen was transferred to
Pensacola, Florida, for advanced flight training. In March 1993, she washed out
of flight school, primarily for poor hand-eye coordination (a rather important
91
ability for a helicopter pilot). Hansen’s removal was upheld by a review board
and by the commander of the school. Hansen then claimed that the failing grade
at Pensacola had been in retaliation for the Corpus Christi sexual harassment
complaint. Reviews by the Navy and Defense Department failed to substantiate
Hansen’s allegation.
Hansen took her complaint to her home-state senator, David Durenberger
92
of Minnesota. Although the decision had already been reviewed up the chain
of command, Admiral Stanley Arthur undertook another review of the matter in
response to an inquiry by the senator. Arthur was Vice Chief of Naval
Operations and the most senior aviator in the Navy. According to one
description, “big, easygoing Stan Arthur was perhaps the best liked and most
93
admired officer in the Navy.” He had been a legendary pilot in Vietnam—
having flown 513 combat missions and been awarded eleven Distinguished
94
Flying Crosses—and was commander of allied naval forces in the Gulf War.
After his review, Admiral Arthur reported to the senator that Hansen was not
qualified to be a pilot. She was a “problem student” who not only lacked
situational awareness but also had a poor attitude. Arthur wrote, “I do not
desire to see her or perhaps others die because she could not perform at a level
95
consistent with our standards.”
Not satisfied with the Navy’s response, Senator Durenberger placed a
“hold” on the nomination of Admiral Arthur to the position of Commander in
Chief of Pacific Forces (CINCPAC), the most prestigious operational command
in the Navy. Apparently unwilling to be accused of taking the wrong position
on a “women’s issue” (and unwilling to leave the CINCPAC position vacant for
96
very long), Admiral Boorda gave up on Arthur’s nomination, an action soon
followed by Admiral Arthur’s retirement.
To add insult to injury (as far as Admiral Arthur’s supporters were
concerned), Admiral Boorda overruled the decision to discharge Hansen and
offered her a job on his staff to work on women’s issues, an offer he had also
97
made to Paula Coughlin. This offer was not good enough for Hansen, who
demanded that the Navy upgrade her poor performance ratings to
90. Rowan Scarborough, Sex Case Trips up Admiral, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at A1
[hereinafter Scarborough, Sex Case Trips].
91. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Navy Now Ousting Would-Be Pilot Who Was Sexually Harassed, BALT.
SUN, June 30, 1994, at 3A [hereinafter Lewthwaite, Navy Now Ousting]; Editorial, Anchors Aweigh,My
Boys and Ms. Lt. Hansen, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A18.
92. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 389.
93. Nick Kotz, Breaking Point, WASHINGTONIAN, Dec. 1996, at 92–121.
94. Id.
95. Scarborough, Sex Case Trips, supra note 90.
96. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 391.
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“outstanding,” promote her to full lieutenant on a non-competitive basis, send
her to law school, and thereafter assign her to work on women’s issues. She also
demanded that the Secretary of the Navy personally apologize to her. When
these demands proved to be too much for even the post-Tailhook Navy, she
99
resigned.
The treatment of Admiral Arthur, a much-revered figure, caused
substantial resentment, especially among “traditionalists” already alarmed by
what they viewed as the overly “politically correct” Navy leadership in the
wake of Tailhook. The Hansen affair sent, in the words of Gregory Vistica, “a
100
clear message—one not to be missed by many admirals.” After Admiral
Arthur’s experience, he wrote, “any politically sensitive officer understood,
rightly or wrongly, that women were to succeed as pilots—period.”
Part of the reaction to Admiral Arthur’s experience was based on the
perception that he was a “warrior” who had not been supported by the
“political” brass. The conflict between these two viewpoints remains in today’s
Navy, and throughout the rest of the military, but at the time it was perhaps at
its height. The conflict came to a head when James Webb—who recently won a
101
U.S. Senate seat in Virginia —gave a blistering speech at the Naval Academy.
Webb is a legendary figure for many people. An Annapolis graduate, he
served as a Marine officer in Vietnam. Injured trying to shelter his men from a
grenade, he returned from Vietnam with numerous medals, including the Navy
102
Cross. In 1979, three years after women were first admitted to the service
academies, Webb made a splash with an article in Washingtonian magazine
103
entitled “Women Can’t Fight.”
On April 25, 1996, Webb gave a speech excoriating Navy leadership. He
stated, in part:
When one of the finest candidates for Commander in Chief of the Pacific in
recent times, a man who flew more than 500 combat missions in Vietnam and
then in the Gulf War commanded the largest naval armada since World War II,
is ordered into early retirement by the Chief of Naval Operations because one
Senator asked on behalf of a constituent why Stan Arthur as Vice Chief of Naval
Operations had simply approved a report upholding a decision to wash out a
female officer from flight school, who expressed their outrage? Who fought this?
Who condemned it?
When a whole generation of officers is asked to accept the flawed wisdom of a
permanent stigma and the destruction of the careers of some of the finest
aviators in the Navy based on hearsay, unsubstantiated allegations, in some

98. Lewthwaite, Navy Now Ousting, supra note 91.
99. Rowan Scarborough, Sex-Case Accuser Demands Pilot Slot, Rejects Pentagon Job, WASH. TIMES,
June 29, 1994, at A9.
100. VISTICA, supra note 14, at 393.
101. Michael D. Shear & Alec MacGillis, Democrats Take Control of Senate As Allen Concedes to
Webb in Va.–Victor Vows New Approach To Iraq War, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006, at A1.
102. Rowan Scarborough, Navy Academic’s Published Attack Riles Webb Allies, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1997, at A6.
103. James Webb, Women Can’t Fight, WASHINGTONIAN, Nov. 1979, available at http://www.
washingtonian.com/articles/mediapolitics/2182.html.
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cases after a full repudiation of anonymous charges that resemble the worst
elements of McCarthyism, in effect, turning over the time-honored, even sacred,
promotional process which lies at the very core of military leadership to a group
of Senate staffers, what admiral has had the courage to risk his own career by
putting his stars on the table and defending the integrity of the process and of
104
his people?

Webb had hit a nerve. His remarks were greeted with a standing ovation by
105
midshipmen in the audience.
Admiral Boorda was dismayed by news of the speech. What bothered him
was not so much the content of Webb’s remarks—that was just “Webb being
106
Webb,” he commented to aides. What seemed to hurt Boorda the most was the
enthusiastic response that Webb had elicited from the midshipmen. The day
before Webb’s speech, Boorda himself had given a speech at the Academy and
had received a standing ovation, yet the next day that same audience was
applauding a man who was raking him over the coals.
On Saturday, May 11, 1996, Boorda told his wife that he was going to retire
107
that summer and not serve out the last two years of his term as CNO. The
following Monday, an anonymous letter was published in the Navy Times
stating that Boorda had lost the respect of the officer corps.
Then came the last straw. Shortly after noon on Thursday, May 16, Boorda
learned that the Newsweek reporters he was scheduled to meet with after lunch
were not coming to follow up on the Webb speech but rather to ask him about
his wearing of “combat distinguishing devices” on his Navy Achievement
Medal and his Navy Commendation Medal, both of which had been awarded to
108
him based upon service off the coast of Vietnam. The Navy had received a
Freedom of Information Act request on Boorda’s medals the year before, after
which the JAG informed Boorda that he was not entitled to wear the “combat
V’s.” Boorda had then stopped wearing them. “It was an honest mistake,”
109
Boorda said after learning of the reporters’ purpose.
Boorda then drove to his home at the Navy Yard in southeast Washington,
and typed two letters, one to his wife and family, the other “To My Sailors.” The
latter noted that “What I am about to do is not very smart but it is right for
110
me.” He had asked his sailors “to do the right thing, to care for and take care
of each other and to stand up for what is good and correct.” He was about to be
accused of improperly wearing the combat devices on two of his medals, and he
did not believe that reporters would believe it was an honest mistake, “and you
may or may not believe it yourselves.” He could not, he wrote, “bear to bring

104. James Webb, Speech at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. (Apr. 25, 1996) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/navy/readings/jwebbspeech.
html).
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dishonor to you.” Then, clad in his dress whites, he went out into his garden
and put a .38-caliber bullet into his heart.
The response to Admiral Boorda’s death reflected the tensions that roiled
the end of his life. Eulogized as a “sailor’s sailor” by Defense Secretary William
Perry, Boorda’s many contributions to the Navy were recounted. Sailors had
genuine fondness for Boorda, in part because he was a “mustang,” an officer
who had worked his way up through the enlisted ranks. A hallmark of his
career was, in the words of one chief petty officer, that “he was always willing to
fight for what we needed: better housing, better living conditions, more time at
home with our families.”
That focus was precisely the problem, according to some of Boorda’s
detractors. Richard Grenier, a columnist for the Washington Times and an
Annapolis graduate and former naval officer himself, wrote:
My friends, now in the older officer class, mostly hate him for having meekly
accepted every attack on the Navy from feminists and politically correct
politicians. When I went to the Academy I was told in no uncertain terms,
“You’re not at a college. You’re not at a university. You’re at a school for
111
fighting men.” I wonder if they still tell the incoming midshipmen that.

Grenier continued, “I’ve never heard a word of praise for Adm. Boorda for
anything even remotely warlike, and on any feminist issue he, of course, always
112
took the woman’s side.”
Thus closed the 40-year career of Admiral Mike Boorda.
B. The Coast Guard, Too
Boorda was not the first military officer to take his life for reasons
ultimately related to Tailhook. Just the year before, Coast Guard Captain Ernie
Blanchard had met a similar fate.
In January 1995, Blanchard stood at a lectern to give a speech at the Coast
Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, to an assemblage of cadets,
113
fellow officers, and guests. Given the times, his first statement was an ominous
one. Turning to Captain Pat Stillman, his old friend and Commandant of Cadets
at the Academy, Blanchard said “Request permission to dispense with political
correctness.” And he did. He attempted to warm up the crowd with what some
called “dirty jokes,” jokes that you would be embarrassed to tell your mother.
Following his “opening monologue,” he turned to more serious Coast Guard
114
topics, which consumed most of his address.
There remains some disagreement about exactly what jokes were told. One
115
was that Pat Stillman and his wife had enjoyed a memorable honeymoon. On
their wedding night she snuggled up to him in a sexy negligee and asked,

111. Richard Grenier, This Is Not the Navy I Knew . . . , WASH. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at A15.
112. Id.
113. Karl Vick, No Laughing Matter, WASH. POST, July 7, 1996, at F1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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“Dear, now that we’re married, can I do anything that I want?” He replied, “Yes,
dear, anything you want.” So, she went to sleep. Another joke involved two
“firsties” (seniors) at a pickup joint. Two underclassmen were there, and one
asked the other “What’s the difference between garbage and a Bravo Company
firstie? The garbage gets picked up!” Yet another involved a cadet who had
given his fiancée a diamond brooch with several maritime signal flags
surrounding it. When complimented on the brooch, she said that her fiancé had
given it to her and that the flags meant “I love you.” In fact, they actually meant
“Permission granted to lay alongside”—ba da boom! All together, Blanchard
told approximately a dozen jokes.
Now, the primary reason one would be embarrassed to tell one’s mother
these jokes is that they are not very funny. They are far from obscene and would
pass unremarked if included in a Jay Leno or David Letterman monologue. Yet,
predictably, some in the audience were offended. The next day, a chaplain
expressed his concerns to Stillman, and the following day a civilian female
116
instructor likewise complained. Consultation with the brass at the Academy
yielded the conclusion that Blanchard should apologize. Blanchard was contrite
and immediately faxed a letter to the Academy to be given to all cadets. His
letter was of the self-flagellation genre, which is de rigueur in these matters: “I
offer my sincere apology if I offended anyone,” he wrote. “If only one person
was offended, then my remarks were inappropriate and I will take action to be
more considerate in the future. Us old seadogs also need to adapt and change
117
the way we have always done things.”
The Academy leadership thought that the matter was taken care of, but not
everyone was satisfied. Some people, most of whom had not attended the
dinner, wanted blood. About a month later, Commander Kathleen Donohoe, the
Coast Guard’s “gender policy adviser,” was at the Academy on a routine visit
and learned about the Blanchard affair from female officers, none of whom had
118
attended the dinner. They gave Donohoe an ultimatum: unless headquarters
commenced an official sexual-harassment investigation, they would go to the
media. Showing the fortitude that the military so often does in such matters,
Admiral Robert Kramek, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, ordered an
investigation.
Blanchard was visited by an investigating officer, Captain David A. Potter,
119
who gave him his Miranda warnings. Blanchard was startled: Over a “bad
joke?,” he asked. He wanted to know how serious it was, and Potter replied that
it was serious enough to convene an informal investigation overseen by Rear
Admiral William C. Donnell, who was in charge of Coast Guard personnel.
About a week later, Blanchard was summoned to Potter’s office for
120
interrogation. Blanchard asked Potter what was the worst that could happen.
Potter replied that Blanchard could be court-martialed and lose his pension. To

116.
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Blanchard, this meant disgrace for himself and financial ruin for his family.
Blanchard called Admiral Donnell and offered to resign from the Coast Guard if
that would head off the investigation. Donnell urged Blanchard not to overreact
and told him that he was being premature. Donnell also told him, however, that
his resignation would not terminate the investigation.
Blanchard was bewildered about why the Coast Guard, the institution that
he so loved and had given thirty of his forty-six years to, seemed to be giving
him no support. He feared that the Coast Guard was going to sacrifice him in
order to avoid the fate that befell the Navy in the wake of Tailhook.
At the office the following Monday, Blanchard said he needed to take a few
121
days off. The next morning, the office called him at home and told him that the
public-affairs staff had learned that the Chicago Tribune was working on a
sexual-harassment story. “It’s all over,” he replied. “We’re doomed.” Within the
next few hours, Blanchard took out an old .32-caliber Winchester revolver that
had belonged to his grandfather, put the gun in his mouth, and pulled the
trigger. Nothing happened; the gun had misfired. Blanchard then fired again,
and this time the gun worked as intended. Blanchard’s wife Connie found his
body in the back yard. As it turned out, the Tribune was not investigating sexual
122
harassment at all.
A “psychological autopsy” concluded that “the emotional pain and shame
that Captain Blanchard felt he had brought upon himself and the Coast Guard
123
led him to choose suicide as a solution.” Writing in the Washington Post, Karl
Vick observed: “This is about a death by political correctness. Whether it was
suicide by political correctness or homicide by political correctness depends on
124
your point of view.” Vick pointed out the parallels between Blanchard and
Boorda: “Both men were terrified of exposure in the media. Each man feared he
would bring disrepute to a service where he had spent his adult life. Each man
was operating under what, to many outside the military, might seem a
bewilderingly unforgiving code of honor and rectitude.”
After Blanchard’s death, Admirals Donnell and Kramek reversed Potter’s
125
findings of sexual harassment. Some months later, Admiral Kramek, speaking
at the National Press Club, denied that Blanchard faced serious punishment.
Kramek stated:
Captain Blanchard was not facing a court-martial, nor would he have ever faced
a court-martial. . . . There was no move to court-martial him, and there wouldn’t
have been after the investigation and fact-finding was over. He hadn’t
committed any offenses serious enough other than to call him in and tell him he
126
had used bad judgment.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Mark Thompson, A Political Suicide, TIME, May 13, 1996, at 44.
124. Vick, supra note 113.
125. Id.
126. National Press Club, Morning Newsmaker With Admiral Robert Kramek, Coast Guard
Commandant, Aug. 5, 1996.
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Given that, even before the investigation had begun, Blanchard had already
been told he had used bad judgment and had issued an apology, one wonders
about the purpose of the Miranda warnings, the extended investigation, the
statement that he could end up being court-martialed and lose his pension, and
the 800-page investigative report of the incident. One also wonders why the
investigation would not have been terminated upon Blanchard’s retirement, if it
was convened only to decide whether Blanchard should be told that he had
used bad judgment.
C. Then Came Aberdeen
Following close on the heels of the Tailhook scandal came another scandal
involving allegations by dozens of female trainees at Aberdeen Proving
Grounds (and shortly thereafter at Fort Leonard Wood) that they had been
subjected to rape and sexual harassment by, or had engaged in fraternization
127
with, their drill sergeants. Determined not to duplicate the Navy’s publicrelations mistake during the early days of the Tailhook scandal (i.e., giving the
initial impression that it was not interested in getting to the bottom of things),
the Army swiftly pulled out all the stops. It set up a worldwide “hot line” for
service members to call to report sexual misconduct, anonymously if they
desired. The Army touted how quickly it had brought charges against some of
128
the instructors as evidence of how seriously it took the complaints. And the
charges were serious. Unlike the night of debauchery that was Tailhook, the
Aberdeen scandal involved charges of a variety of sexual misbehavior,
including forcible rape and sodomy, on an apparently broad scale and
extending over a prolonged period of time.
Sexual relations between instructors and trainees apparently were
widespread, although most cases did not involve force, and in many of them the
female trainees were willing participants in—or even the instigators of—the
129
sexual behavior. The Army took the position that the sex between instructors
and trainees was per se not consensual, because of the imbalance of power and
the “constructive force” that necessarily occurred as a result. Thus, even if the
sexual relations had been initiated by the trainee, the instructor was still charged
with rape.
The most heavily punished wrongdoer was Sergeant Delmar Simpson, who
was convicted of multiple counts of rape and sodomy and sentenced to twentyfive years in prison. Although clearly inappropriate and certainly warranting a
dishonorable discharge, Simpson’s conduct was not sufficiently egregious in the
130
eyes of some to warrant the heavy punishment. Writing in The New Republic,
Hannah Rosin observed about the Army’s “constructive force” argument:

127. Rowan Scarborough, Army Trainees Accuse Instructors of Rape, Harassment, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1996, at A3.
128. Lewthwaite, supra note 49.
129. Jackie Spinner & Dana Priest, Consensual Sex Was Rampant at Army Base; Inquiry Finds
Breakdown of Discipline at Aberdeen, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1997, at A1.
130. Dana Priest, Verdict Deepens Divisions Over Women in Uniform; While Some Hail Army’s
Prosecution, Critics Say Crime of Rape Has Been Redefined, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1997, at A14.
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The storyline has remained unchanged: the entire military is an alien, retrograde
institution, conspiring against feminist concerns. So it may be. But not from the
evidence at the Aberdeen trials. . . . The most tradition-minded, socially
conservative and overwhelmingly male institution in America has in fact
embraced a theory of sexual intercourse that belongs not only to feminism, but
to feminism’s more radical wing. On the central question of the trials—whether
or not the sex was consensual—the United States Army has proved itself less a
131
disciple of Rambo than of Andrea Dworkin and Susan Brownmiller.

By attempting to avoid the Tailhook mistake of not initially responding
vigorously enough, the Army made the Navy’s second mistake of overreaching. This became apparent when, several months into the investigation,
five female soldiers came forward and accused Army investigators of pressuring
132
them to make false claims of sexual abuse. Four of the women acknowledged
having consensual sexual relations with instructors, but they refused to accuse
the men of rape, despite what they characterized as bullying by investigators to
do so. The fifth woman confessed to having consensual sexual relations with an
instructor, but later recanted the charge attributing it to coercion by
133
instructors.
The “hot line” was also a big success by some measures, yielding over 8,000
134
calls, many anonymous. Ironically, among those netted was the general who
had taken over the Aberdeen base after most of the misconduct had occurred. It
seems that, five years earlier, he had an affair with a civilian in his office at a
time when he and his wife were separating and anticipating divorce. He was
135
forced into retirement. Finally uncomfortable with the system of anonymous
complaints, even Defense Secretary William Cohen began questioning whether
they had gone too far. As Charles Moskos noted, the hot lines “opened up a
Pandora’s box for those seeking revenge for whatever reason, and many good
136
careers are being ruined needlessly.” The Army ended up shutting down the
Aberdeen hot line.
D. Fraternization, Adultery, and Harassment
With a spate of fraternization and adultery cases in the 1990s, the public
came to learn that military personnel live under very different rules from those
governing the civilian world. These rules often clash with civilian mores, but the
military views them as critical to the maintenance of good order and discipline.

131. Hannah Rosin, Sleeping with the Enemy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 1997, at 19.
132. Paul C. Roberts, Crying Rape to Hide Failed Policy?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1997, at A14;
Rowan Scarborough, Prober Problems?: Female Recruits Say Army Pressured Them to Make False Charges
of Rape, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at A1; Jackie Spinner & Dana Priest, Women Say Army Agents
Bullied Them: 5 Allege Investigators Urged Sex Accusations, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1997, at A14.
133. Editorial, Rank Accusations, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at A20.
134. Rowan Scarborough, Sex-Abuse Hot Lines’ Value Questioned: Gone Too Far? Cohen Wonders,
WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Scarborough, Sex-Abuse Hot Lines’ Value].
135. Editorial, Overly Friendly Fire, WASH. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A22 [hereinafter Overly Friendly
Fire]; Rowan Scarborough, Army Probers Live under Tailhook Specter: Former Lawyer for Fliers Sees
Attempt “To Make Heads Roll”, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at A1.
136. Scarborough, Sex-Abuse Hot Lines’ Value, supra note 134.
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Unfortunately for military discipline, however, the increasing prevalence of an
“occupational” orientation leads to the same kind of resentment of such rules
that would attend them in civilian life. In his study of extended field maneuvers
in Honduras, for example, Charles Moskos found a widespread attitude among
junior enlisted personnel of both sexes that what they did in their “private lives”
137
was their own business, rather than the Army’s. Women most strongly
objected to the anti-fraternization rules, hardly surprising in light of the
unbalanced sex ratio in the military.
1. Kelly Flinn
In 1997, accusations of adultery and fraternization against Kelly Flinn, the
first female B-52 bomber pilot, created a national spectacle. She was threatened
with court-martial for having an affair with the civilian husband of a female
airman, disobeying a direct order from a superior not to see him again (in fact, a
week after that order, she took him to Georgia to meet her parents), lying under
oath to investigators about the relationship, and fraternizing with an enlisted
138
man (including an episode of sexual intercourse with him on her front lawn).
The most visible reaction from the civilian community focused on the
adultery charge, stemming from the belief that Flinn should not be punished for
having had a sexual relationship with a married man. After all, the argument
went, her private life was her own business and a court-martial was a gross
139
over-reaction. Furthermore, critics argued, under most civilian definitions of
140
adultery, Flinn was not guilty because she was unmarried. Under military
rules, however, an unmarried person commits adultery by having sexual
141
relations with a married person.
The objection that the Air Force was over-reacting to the adultery ignored
the fact that there would have been no adultery charge if Flinn had simply
terminated her relationship with the airman’s husband when she was ordered

137. Charles C. Moskos, Female GIs in the Field, SOCIETY, Sept./Oct. 1985, at 28, 31.
138. Elaine Sciolino, Pilot Facing Adultery Charge Agrees to a General Discharge, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1997, at A1; Nancy Gibbs, Wings of Desire: The Air Force’s Star Female Pilot Finds Herself Enmeshed in a
Tale Full of Passion and Lies, TIME, June 2, 1997, at 28.
139. Elaine Sciolino, From a Love Affair to a Court-Martial, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997, at A1.
140. Richard Cohen, Snooping on Soldiers, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at A23.
141. Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) (general article)
[A]ll disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter [10 U.S.C. §§ 801–934] may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion
of that court.
Id. (alterations added). According to the Manual for Courts-Martial, the elements of adultery are:
(1) That the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with a certain person;
(2) That, at the time, the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces.
Manual for Courts-Martial, Punitive Article 134, 64(b).
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to. No charges were brought against her when her superiors learned of the affair
through complaints of the female airman. Surely, the Air Force’s reaction to a
female airman’s complaint about an officer having an affair with her husband
should not have been “That’s her business, not ours; go away.”
In contrast to the reaction of the press, the position of the military and most
of its defenders was that the adultery charge was only a small part of the
transgression. Although the adultery was not trivial, more threatening to
military discipline was Flinn’s disobeying an order and lying to her superior. As
Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman stated in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, “This is not an issue of adultery. This is an
issue about an officer, entrusted to fly nuclear weapons, who lied. That’s what
142
this is about.”
What may have been the greatest threat to military discipline, however, got
little attention: Flinn was having an affair not just with any married man, but
with the husband of a female airman. Adultery violates the Uniform Code of
143
Military Justice only if it impairs “good order and discipline.” It is hard to
imagine a greater threat to good order and discipline in the enlisted ranks than
“poaching” of the spouses of enlisted personnel by officers. Indeed, numerous
male officers have been prosecuted for making sexual advances toward enlisted
144
men’s wives, with no public outcry.
Outcry there was for Kelly Flinn, however. Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott expressed the view that the Air Force had “badly abused” Flinn and that
she should, at the least, be granted an honorable discharge. The Air Force
should “get real” and ease its rules against relationships between its personnel,
145
he said. Representative Nita Lowey of New York declared, “The Air Force
should have offered Kelly Flinn counseling, warnings and a transfer. Instead it
has thrown the book at her, treating her like a criminal.” Of course, Flinn, in fact,
had been counseled and warned, and she had disregarded the warnings. As for
“treating her like a criminal,” the Air Force had some justification: she was one.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice makes criminal the following:
fraternization, adultery detrimental to good order and discipline, failure to obey
a lawful order, and lying under oath; Flinn faced the possibility, although not
146
the likelihood, of 9-1/2 years of imprisonment. The New York Times also
rushed to Flinn’s defense, characterizing her conduct as mere “lovesick
147
148
blundering.” A publisher gave Flinn a lucrative book contract. For her part,
Flinn argued that, although the Air Force “trained me to carry nuclear weapons,
it had not taught me how to be a human being; and nobody had taught the Air

142. Gregory Vistica & Evan Thomas, Sex and Lies, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1997, at 26.
143. See supra note 141.
144. Kevin W. Carter, Fraternization, 113 MIL. L. REV. 61, 79 n.107 (Summer 1996).
145. Elaine Sciolino, Air Force to Postpone its Court-Martial of Female Pilot, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1997, at A16.
146. Vistica & Thomas, supra note 142.
147. Editorial, Trent Lott’s Military Mind, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1997, at A22.
148. Judy Quinn, A “Big Book” Correction, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Mar. 23, 1998, at 41, 44.
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Force how to deal with women.” She was “singled out for shame,” she said,
because she was a woman. In fact, however, the prior year, sixty-seven Air Force
150
personnel had been court-martialed for adultery, of whom sixty were men.
In the end, Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall offered Flinn a deal. Rather
than the honorable discharge that Flinn was seeking or the court-martial that
most of the brass wanted, Flinn could accept a “general discharge under
honorable conditions,” a form of discharge given to those whose negative record
outweighs their positive contributions but who have not brought disgrace upon
151
the uniform. With such a discharge, rather than an honorable one, Flinn would
not be able to fly for the National Guard. Apparently realizing what a good deal
she was offered, she accepted.
Had the sexes been reversed, and a male Air Force pilot had been having
an affair with the wife of an enlisted man, it is doubtful that the national media
and congressional leaders would have rushed to the pilot’s defense or that he
would have been favored with a lucrative book contract. Indeed, he would have
almost certainly been viewed as a sexual predator rather than a figure worthy of
our sympathy.
Ironically, Kelly Flinn herself can be considered a victim of Tailhook. That
scandal made the services much more sensitive to claims of sexual misconduct,
as witnessed by the almost doubling of the number of Air Force adultery courts152
martial between 1990 and 1996. Without that increased sensitivity, she might
have been ignored if she had maintained a low profile, although once the female
airman complained, it is difficult to see how the Air Force could have responded
any way other than the way it did.
2. “Payback”: General Joseph Ralston
With Kelly Flinn having been abused so badly in the eyes of her defenders,
it was inevitable that there would be “payback.” Payback there was, and it came
quickly. Shortly after culmination of the Flinn affair, Air Force General Joseph
Ralston was the leading candidate for the position of Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the country’s top military post. It turned out, however, that, as a
colonel back in the early 1980s, he had begun an affair with a female CIA
153
intelligence analyst while he was studying at the National War College. At the
time, he was separated, but not divorced, from his wife.
Ralston’s situation was very different from Flinn’s. Ralston had not
disobeyed an order, and he had not lied. The adultery itself was not harmful to
good order and discipline. It was private and did not involve the chain of
command. Nonetheless, the sharp knives were out. Then-congressman Charles
Schumer insisted that it is “a double standard and it is wrong” not to punish
154
General Ralston. Secretary Cohen continued to support General Ralston,
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despite claims that, not only should Ralston not be confirmed as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, but he should also be disciplined. As one congresswoman put
it, “If you are a friend of the Secretary of Defense and you’ve had an affair,
155
you’re in. If you’re a successful woman who’d had an affair, you’re out.” Amid
156
the furor, Ralston withdrew his name from consideration.
The ultimate irony of the Flinn case is that there was in fact a double
standard applied. She got off much easier than most people charged with those
offenses would have. In the years following Flinn’s case, many military
personnel charged with adultery or fraternization would beg to be treated as
“badly” as Kelly Flinn was, claiming that, if she got off so easily, so should
157
they.
The inevitability of problems arising from fraternization rules makes it
tempting to conclude that the rules should simply be changed. Most civilian
employees do not stand to lose their jobs if they get caught cheating on their
spouse, for example, and most civilian employers do not object to romantic
relationships among employees of different status, as long as there is no
reporting relationship or indirect supervisory control. Because of differences
between the military and the civilian sector, however, such relationships create
different problems, and these problems can ultimately lead to lives being lost.
As Kelly Flinn herself wrote, “You can’t have an aircraft commander and a
copilot get into a lover’s quarrel at six hundred feet and crash their plane into
158
the side of a building.”
3. Claudia Kennedy: A High-Ranking “Victim”
As so many officers, especially men, learned after Tailhook, it does not take
much to derail a career when sex is involved. When Major General Larry G.
Smith was nominated for the position of deputy Army inspector general, Lt.
Gen. Claudia Kennedy came forward to scuttle his appointment. She claimed
that Smith, who at the time held the same rank that she did (both major
generals), had “touched her in a sexual manner and tried to kiss her” in her
159
Pentagon office four years earlier. She did not allege a pattern of such activity,
only that it happened on one occasion. There was no indication that similar
incidents had occurred with other women. There was no attempt to intimidate
with rank. Nonetheless, the nomination was withdrawn and Smith was forced
into retirement.
Once again, the Army seemed to be overreacting. Washington Post
columnist Richard Cohen asked, “Whatever happened to understanding that in

155. John Barry & Evan Thomas, Shifting Lines: After Cracking down on an Adulterous Female Pilot,
the Brass Shields an Adulterous Male General, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1997, at 32.
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Comparison to Flinn, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1997, at A1.
157. See, e.g., Charlie Goodyear, Air Force Set to Try Travis Pilot over Affair; Accused Captain Could
Get 27 Years in Prison, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1999, at A21; Steve Young, S.D. Captain’s Love Tale Could
End in Jail, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Apr. 18, 1999, at 1A.
158. KELLY FLINN, PROUD TO BE: MY LIFE, THE AIR FORCE, THE CONTROVERSY 246 (1997).
159. Thomas E. Ricks & Robert Suro, Army Verifies Harassment Claim: Female General’s Charge
Likely to Mean Reprimand, Retirement for Fellow Officer, WASH. POST, May 11, 2000, at A1.
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matters of love, sex, romance and that sort of thing, all sorts of
misunderstandings are possible?” He pointed out that, if General Kennedy had
welcomed the kiss, there would have been no transgression. “Making a pass
160
nowadays is like striking at the king,” he said, “You’d better succeed.”
Columnist Mona Charen noted that General Kennedy—best known for
implementing the “Consideration of Others” (“COO”) training, which taught
soldiers to “indicate a sensitivity to and regard for the feelings and needs of
others”—had three years earlier described sexual harassment as follows: “His
hand lingers on your back. He touches you on your upper arm and you can’t tell
161
if he’s a touchy-feely person. All you know is that he gives you the creeps.”
Charen asks, “Our women warriors, who insist they should be permitted to lead
men in battle, cannot handle so much as a touch on the upper arm?” About the
COO program, Charen tartly quipped, “Heck, why not close down the Army
and replace it with a sewing circle?”
If the Claudia Kennedy case is “sexual harassment”—with no imbalance in
power, no persistent and repeated conduct, and little more than a rebuffed
advance—then almost all men have been guilty of sexual harassment. Only the
lucky few whose advances are never rejected are spared the “predator” label,
and it is tempting to think of them as the most predatory of all. If Kennedy had
been the one who initiated the contact, say by placing her hand on Smith’s thigh,
would we feel comfortable forcing her into retirement simply because he
expressed a lack of interest? What would we have thought of Smith for having
made the incident public? Would we have thought that he was nobly “speaking
truth to power,” or would we have concluded that he was a pathetic figure
unfairly attempting to terminate the career of a female colleague? It is difficult to
imagine that he would be viewed positively.
III. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
If anyone thought that sexual problems would end at the millennium, they
were sadly mistaken. Although the spate of “blockbuster” scandals of the
nineties has not been repeated, scandals persist.
A. The Air Force Academy
Perhaps the event that received the most press coverage in the new century
was the allegation of rampant rape and sexual assault at the Air Force Academy
and the claims of official indifference, if not hostility, toward those who reported
such misconduct. These allegations, first made in an e-mail to Secretary of the
Air Force James G. Roche, resulted in a series of investigations. An investigation
headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary L. Walker confirmed that there had

160.
161.

Richard Cohen, Did the General Deserve This?, WASH. POST, July 20, 2000, at A25.
Mona Charen, The General’s Protracted Charge, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A18.

02__BROWNE.DOC

778 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

6/18/2007 3:00 PM

Volume 14:749 2007

been several dozen cases of sexual assault over the prior decade but concluded
162
that most of them had been appropriately disposed of by the Academy.
One problem identified in the report was that the Air Force Academy’s
definition of sexual assault was broader than the criminal-law definition, and
the breadth of that definition may have created unreasonable expectations on
163
the part of those complaining. For example, any sexual conduct engaged in
when the non-initiating party is “alcohol impaired” is defined as sexual assault
by the Academy, whereas under the UCMJ, consent is effective unless the
alcohol impairment is so severe as to render the person incapable of consent. In
other words, having “one too many” and consenting to sex that you later regret
appears to constitute sexual assault under Academy rules but not under the
UCMJ. Another identified problem was the intermingling of rooms of men and
women in the dormitories—where a majority of incidents of sexual assault
164
occurred—rather than having separate space for the two sexes.
Although the review by the General Counsel’s group, as well as a
subsequent review by the Inspectors General of the Air Force and Defense
Department identified some procedural shortcomings at the Academy, they did
not confirm the central thrust of the Air Force Academy scandal—that the
Academy was a hotbed of rape and sexual assault and that its leadership cared
165
little for the plight of the victims. Indeed, it is not clear that sexual assault rates
are as high at the Air Force Academy as at civilian universities of comparable
166
size.
B. A Medley of Little Scandals
Continued problems revolving around sex continue to plague the military.
A taste of ongoing problems can be obtained simply by looking at some
headlines:
Warship or Loveboat: One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases of Fraternization and/or
167
Adultery and the Courts-Martial Aren’t Over Yet.
Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The Disturbing Tale of a Brand-New
168
Destroyer.

162. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE OF AND RESPONSE TO
INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 158 (2003), http://www.dtic.mil/
dtfs/doc_research/p18_17.pdf.
163. Id. at 22–26.
164. Id. at 103.
165. Id. at 158–64; AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GEN., SUMMARY REPORT CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES AT THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY (2004), http://www.af.mil/
library/posture/usafa_report.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
EVALUATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, REPRISAL, AND RELATED LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES AT THE UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY (2004) [hereinafter OIG, EVALUATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2004/d20041207igsummary.pdf.
166. See generally BONNIE S. FISHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN, & MICHAEL G. TURNER, THE SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000).
167. William H. McMichael, Warship or Loveboat: One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases of
Fraternization and/or Adultery and the Courts-Martial Aren’t over Yet, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at 14.
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169

Pentagon Blocks Nudie GI Peep Site.

Amorous Officers on Notice in Wake of Air Force Case.

170

Pimping Alleged at Patrick: NCO Arranged for Subordinate to Have Sex with
171
Inspector, Captain, Charges Say, followed by Sex for Job Status: AF NCO Guilty of
172
Goading Subordinate into Liaisons.
Pulling the Plug on Video Voyeurs: Peeping Cameras Found Aboard Ships Reflect
173
Disturbing Technical Trend.
“I Wasn’t Wearing the Uniform”: And That, Former Sailor Argues, Made Posing for
174
Playboy OK.
Admiral Loses Battle Group Command: Improper Relationship with Officer Costs
175
Kunkle His Kitty Hawk Post, followed by Female Officer Gets Reprimand, Will
176
Retire.
On a Strange Mission: Police Say Astronaut Drove 12 Hours, Donned Disguise and
177
Assaulted Woman She Saw as Rival for Shuttle Pilot’s Love.

The central flaw exhibited by the military in the sex arena is its failure to
appreciate the nuances of sexual issues. By announcing, in essence, “zero
tolerance for everything sexual,” it has lost the ability to differentiate between
serious threats and bad manners. Tailhook was certainly more than bad
manners, but the Navy prosecuted it as if it had been mass rape. Unfortunately,
the primary lesson learned by the military is that “nothing exceeds like excess,”
as witnessed by the prosecutorial excesses of the Aberdeen incident.
One would like to think that the crusading zeal has abated, that the lesson
has been absorbed that over-reaction ultimately hurts rather than helps the
cause of female integration. Recent incidents at the Naval Academy suggest that
such a hope is unwarrantedly optimistic.

168. William H. McMichael, Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The Disturbing Tale of a
Brand-New Destroyer, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 14.
169. Niles Lathem, Pentagon Blocks Nudie GI Peep Site, N.Y. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at 23.
170. Thomas E. Ricks, Amorous Officers on Notice in Wake of Air Force Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
2000, at A4.
171. Rod Hafemeister, Pimping Alleged at Patrick: NCO Arranged for Subordinate to Have Sex with
Inspector, Captain, Charges Say, AIR FORCE TIMES, June 19, 2006, at 8.
172. Rod Hafemeister, Sex for Job Status: AF NCO Guilty of Goading Subordinate into Liaisons, AIR
FORCE TIMES, July 24, 2006, at 16.
173. Matt Hilburn, Pulling the Plug on Video Voyeurs; Peeping Cameras Found Aboard Ships Reflect
Disturbing Technical Trend, NAVY TIMES, May 17, 2004, at 10.
174. Christopher Munsey, “I Wasn’t Wearing the Uniform”: And That, Former Sailor Argues, Made
Posing for Playboy OK, NAVY TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at 8.
175. Christopher Munsey, Admiral Loses Battle Group Command: Improper Relationship with Officer
Costs Kunkle His Kitty Hawk Post, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at 8.
176. Female Officer Gets Reprimand, Will Retire, NAVY TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, available at
http://www.navytimes.com/legacy/new/0-NAVYPAPER-2132282.php.
177. Henry P. Curtis, On a Strange Mission: Police Say Astronaut Drove 12 Hours, Donned Disguise
and Assaulted Woman She Saw as Rival for Shuttle Pilot’s Love, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 2007, at A7.
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C. Lieutenant Bryan Black
In August 2005, Lt. Bryan Black, a Naval Academy oceanography instructor
on a training cruise to Norfolk, said something to several midshipmen to the
effect that the decommissioned battleship USS Wisconsin gave him a “hard-on,”
and he suggested to the lone female midshipman that the Wisconsin, instead of
giving her an erection, “would be tweaking your nipples.” That statement was
certainly bad manners and worthy of a reprimand, but the Academy turned it
178
into a court-martial offense. The female midshipman, warrior-in-training
Samantha Foxton, later said that she was “appalled” by the statement but that
Black had apologized to her the next day and that she had accepted his apology.
Unfortunately for Black, however, a female faculty member, who apparently
nursed a strong dislike for Black, conducted her own “investigation” and
pushed the matter to higher levels. It turned out that not only had Black made
the comment in Norfolk, but someone also reported that he had used vulgar
language to characterize his ex-wife.
An investigation by Marine JAG officer Major C. J. Thielemann, a professor
of leadership and law at the Academy, concluded that Black should be issued a
179
“non-punitive letter of caution and counsel.” The Academy superintendent,
Vice Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, rejected Thielemann’s recommendation,
however, and insisted instead on holding an admiral’s mast, a hearing that
could result in up to sixty days’ confinement to quarters and a letter of
reprimand, which would effectively terminate his career. The superintendent
also announced that he was taking the unusual step of holding the usually
private proceeding in the foyer of the administration building and inviting the
faculty and staff to attend. Sensing—no doubt correctly—that the proceeding
was to be a “show trial” to make an example out of him rather than to mete out
justice, Black invoked his right to refuse the admiral’s mast and proceed by
special court-martial.
Admiral Rempt’s decision to disregard the recommendation of a
nonpunitive letter was widely viewed as influenced by criticism he had received
from the Academy’s Board of Visitors that he was not making sufficient
180
progress against sexual harassment. Black’s lawyer attempted to disqualify
Rempt from convening the court-martial and to move the proceeding to a
different command where the jury pool would not include Naval Academy
faculty. He argued that his client could not get a fair trial because of unlawful
command influence. Major Thielemann testified at a preliminary hearing that,
because of this political pressure, Rempt was attempting to make an example
out of Black. Indeed, Thielemann testified, he was actually concerned for his
own career, because his condemnation of Black’s behavior had not been as hardhitting as the admiral had wanted.

178. Andrew Scutro, Foul Comments: Academy Instructor’s Remarks Land Him in Court-Martial,
NAVY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 8.
179. Earl Kelly, Academy Professor Unfairly Targeted?, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Jan. 14, 2006, at A1.
180. Id. Kathleen Parker, The Dangers of Cussing like a Sailor; The Altar of Victim Advocacy Takes on
Salty Language, CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2006, at C19.
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Ultimately, after holding the court-martial over Black’s head for months,
Admiral Rempt offered to downgrade the proceeding to an admiral’s mast to be
held before a different admiral “to avoid any perception of bias or any
181
predetermined outcome.” As this is what Black and his lawyer had earlier
requested, the offer was accepted. The hearing lasted an hour, and Black was
given a “non-punitive letter of caution,” which does not become a part of his
military record, although a negative fitness report from the Academy could
nonetheless block any promotion and lead to his forced dismissal. Black was
counseled by the admiral before whom the proceeding was held and advised,
among other things, that it was unwise to have dinner at Hooters restaurant
182
because of the “appearance of impropriety.” No, this really is not your father’s
Navy.
Predictably, self-styled advocates for women were upset that something
remained of Lt. Black’s career. One asserted that, in the civilian world, the
offended employee (one hesitates to call her a “victim”) would have been able to
183
obtain redress in the courts. This is not true. The case would almost certainly
be dismissed before trial, since to be actionable the offending conduct must be
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
184
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Much worse
185
conduct than this—including conduct by a former Commander in Chief —has
been held to fall short of that standard.
Ultimately the right result was reached. Black’s comment was clearly
inappropriate and deserving of admonishment, as he himself acknowledged,
first by apologizing and then after the admiral’s mast by admitting his mistake.
But at what cost in time and money? Black’s original comment was made in
August 2005, and the admiral’s mast did not take place until September 2006.
Black had been scheduled to deploy to Bahrain shortly after the complaint to
support the fighting in Iraq, but his orders were changed because of the
complaint, placing him in “limbo.” The result obtained was one that the Navy
could have had from the very start but declined in its zeal to appease the
Academy’s critics.
What would have happened if the sexes had been reversed between Black
and the midshipman? Probably nothing. There would likely have been no
complaint even if a male midshipman had been offended. And, can one really
imagine a female officer being prosecuted for having said vulgar things about
her ex-husband? It is extremely unlikely that any man would complain, and if
he did, his complaint almost certainly would have been ignored and he would
have been made to feel like a fool for complaining.
The overreaction of the Academy does women no favors. The blog CDR
Salamander, apparently hosted by a Navy commander, predicts that the response

181. Bradley Olson, Ex-Academy Instructor Cleared at Hearing; Officer Receives No Punishment for
“Crude” Remarks, BALT. SUN, Sept. 2, 2006, at 1A.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
185. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675–76 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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to the Black case—and presumably others like it—will be that “the smart officers
will gather their male buddies and ditch their female shipmates at the first
chance they get on liberty or the weekends.” Then, he notes, “Wait, my male JOs
186
[junior officers] already do that . . . those who aren’t sleeping with them.” The
whole affair, he says,
does a disservice to the great women I have served with who have more
important things to do than get the vapors over some big talking LT, and wind
up chewing up dozens to hundreds of Flag Officer hours over less than she will
187
hear in the first liberty call overseas.

D. Lamar Owens
The other recent incident at the Naval Academy was the court-martial of
Lamar Owens. Owens was the star quarterback of the Navy football team, and
the team’s “most valuable player,” who had taken Navy to a victory in the
Poinsettia Bowl in the 2005 season. The charges against Owens were much more
serious than those against Black. He was accused of having raped a fellow
midshipman in Bancroft Hall, the residence hall at the Academy, in January
2006.
The case was a classic “he said, she said” acquaintance-rape case. Both
parties agreed that sex had taken place. She said that it was non-consensual; he
said that it was consensual. The exact truth is hard to know, but what is crystal
clear is that the prosecution had a very weak case.
According to the woman, she had been drinking heavily the night of the
incident. Indeed, she testified, she had consumed seven or eight drinks in a twohour period, including at least four shots of hard liquor and three mixed drinks.
She went home to her room and fell asleep. She awoke around four in the
morning, she said, to find that Owens—whom she barely knew—had come to
her room uninvited and was kissing her. She turned away from him, said that
she had a boyfriend, and then “blacked out.” Owens then climbed into bed and
raped her. Her roommate was asleep in the room, but the accuser did not call
188
out to her.
According to Owens, he and the woman had been flirting and getting to
know each other in the weeks before the incident. That night, shortly before the
incident, the woman had sent him an instant message inviting him to her room.
When he got there, they chatted, and she climbed into her bunk and tugged on
his sweater, indicating that she wanted him to join her in bed. They began

186. CDR Salamander, LT Black’s Court Martial: Unintended Consequences (Jan. 25, 2006),
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2006/01/lt-blacks-court-martial-unintended.html.
187. Id.
188. Bradley Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape in Her Dorm: Defense Attacks Credibility, Says Navy QB
Had Consensual Sex, BALT. SUN, July 12, 2006, at 1A [hereinafter Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape].
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having sex, but she passed out, so he stopped (without ejaculating) and left the
189
room.
About ten days after the incident, Owens called her and “tearfully
apologized” to her, saying, “I’m so sorry. . . . I woke up the next day and I called
190
you, and I wanted to kill myself and I still feel like that.” He also said, “I didn’t
do it long.” Unbeknownst to Owens, Navy investigators were recording the call.
Owens’s general court-martial occurred in July 2006. He was charged with
rape, conduct unbecoming an officer, and violation of a protective order against
being near the alleged victim after the incident, the last charge added later after
he had been observed on the hallway where her room was. The rape charge
carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and the other charges carried
lesser penalties, including prison and a dishonorable discharge. A discharge
under these circumstances would require Owens to repay the $136,000 cost of
191
his Naval Academy education.
The alleged victim’s testimony was marred by inconsistencies and claims of
selective memory loss due to black-out from alcohol consumption. She admitted
that she drank almost every weekend from the time she arrived at the academy
until the incident, which, because she was under twenty-one, was a rule
192
violation for which she could have been expelled. Despite her trial testimony
that she had not invited Owens to her room, her boyfriend testified that days
after the incident she told him that she “might have” sent Owens an instant
message inviting him to her room. At the Article 32 hearing to determine if there
was enough evidence to proceed to court-martial—similar to a preliminary
hearing in the civilian world—she was asked whether it was possible that she
gave Owens her consent and because of her intoxication did not remember it.
She responded, “I suppose,” adding later that “I wouldn’t define it as consent if
193
I can’t remember it happening.”
A central issue in the trial concerned whether the accuser had sent the
instant-message invitation to Owens. Her boyfriend testified that he had left her
at her room at 3:30 a.m. and returned to his room. She began sending him
instant messages, asking him to come back. The last such message was sent at
3:47 a.m. Then, at 4:12 a.m., she sent him a telephone text message after the
alleged rape had occurred. He came to her room and found her crying
hysterically. She told him, “I think I was raped” and identified Owens as the
perpetrator.
At 4:11 a.m., one minute before she sent the text message to her boyfriend,
the instant-message session on her computer had been closed, erasing any
189. Bradley Olson, Owens Claims Accuser Invited Him into Bed: Mid Says Alleged Victim
“Misrepresented” Facts of Case, BALT. SUN, July 19, 2006, at 1B [hereinafter Olson, Owen Claims Accuser
Invited].
190. Bradley Olson, Mid Player Apologized to Accuser on Tape: Phone Call Used at Rape Hearing of
Navy Quarterback, BALT. SUN. 9, 2006, at 1A.
191. Raymond McCaffrey & Steve Vogel, Case Stirs Criticism of Naval Academy Chief: As ExQuarterback Waits for Decision on Future, Alumni Question Leadership, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at C1.
192. Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape, supra note 188.
193. Bradley Olson, Navy Trial in Rape Case: Mids’ Quarterback to Face Most Serious Form of CourtMartial, BALT. SUN, Apr. 29, 2006, at 1B [hereinafter Navy Trial in Rape Case].
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instant messages that might have occurred between her and Owens. The accuser
testified at trial, however, that she had not gotten out of bed between the time of
the alleged rape and the time that her boyfriend arrived. She said that she did
not know how the instant-message session was closed, although the defense
194
argued that she had closed it to eliminate evidence that she had invited Owen.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor made three points. First, the accuser
had no reason to lie; second, she had been crying hysterically when her
boyfriend came to her room; and third, Owens’s recorded conversation with her
was evidence of a guilty mind—a window into his soul, she said.
In his closing argument, Owens’s lawyer, Reid Weingarten—known best
for his defense of high-profile white-collar defendants—emphasized the many
weaknesses in the woman’s story. Gaps in her memory made her unable to
remember whether she had invited Owens to her room, even though she had
initially testified with some certainty that she had not. The woman also had no
explanation for how the instant-message session had been closed. The
prosecution’s theory that Owens came to her room uninvited, Weingarten
argued, implies the unlikely scenario that Owens was just “prowling” the halls
looking for someone to rape, and, coincidentally, he just happened to show up
just after she had instant-messaged her boyfriend at 3:47 a.m. Finally, the “black
out” seemed to be strangely selective. The woman’s story was that she was
sleeping and unconscious only for the 20 minutes of the encounter, but was
sending instant messages just before it happened and text messages right after.
As for the recorded conversation between Owens and the victim, Weingarten
pointed to Owens’s testimony that he made the statements because he had
heard there was an investigation going on, and he was trying to get her to “back
off” of making charges, hoping to avoid a confrontation. He realized only when
195
she passed out how impaired she was, at which point he left.
The defense’s theory was that the accuser had consented to the sex, had
then regretted it, and relied on the Academy’s practice of not punishing alleged
rape victims for their conduct violations. Moreover, he argued, Owens was a
scapegoat: “A system, needing to look like it was tough on rape, having a star
196
quarterback in its sights, took the bait. And here we are.”
The jury deliberated for about ten hours before reaching its verdict. It
found Owens not guilty of rape but guilty of conduct unbecoming and violation
197
of the protective order. The jury then recommended “no penalty” for the
198
offenses for which Owens was convicted. Owens was not completely out of
the woods, however, as it was now left to the Academy—in the person of
Admiral Rempt—to decide what kind of administrative action to take. Although

194. Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape, supra note 188.
195. Olson, Owens Claims Accuser Invited, supra note 189.
196. Bradley Olson, Judge Rebukes Prosecution in Owens Rape Trial: Navy, Defense Close Arguments;
Verdict Could Be Returned Today, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2006, at 2B.
197. Nelson Hernandez, Navy Quarterback Cleared of Raping Midshipman, WASH. POST, July 21,
2006, at A1.
198. Nelson Hernandez, No Penalty for Midshipman Owens: Found Guilty of Two Non-Rape Charges,
WASH. POST, July 22, 2006, at B1.
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Owens was scheduled to graduate in May 2006, his graduation was held up,
leaving open the possibility that he could be discharged from the Academy,
which would require him both to reimburse the Navy for the cost of his tuition
199
and to leave the Academy without the degree that he had earned. In February
2007, after leaving Owens twisting in the wind for seven months, Admiral
Rempt recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that Owens be expelled from
200
the Academy with neither a commission nor a diploma. As of March 2007, the
Secretary has not acted, although the Academy’s recommendations are usually
201
accepted.
The eagerness of the Academy to appear tough ultimately harmed its case.
After the incident but prior to the court-martial, two e-mails were sent out to the
Academy community at Admiral Rempt’s direction. One e-mail referred to the
alleged victim as “the sexual assault victim,” without any qualifying language
202
indicating that the claim was just an allegation yet to be proved. Another email advised recipients to be wary of media accounts, stating that “the only
story that gets to the media” is a false or misleading one told by defense
203
attorneys.
The defense argued prior to trial that these communications constituted
unlawful command influence, tainting the jury pool, which is drawn from the
204
command bringing the charges. Thus, the jury was to consist of Naval
Academy officers—selected by the convening authority (Admiral Rempt)—who
were among the recipients of the e-mails. The defense argued for dismissal of
the charges, or, failing that, use of a different jury pool.
The judge agreed that at least “the appearance of unlawful command
influence” was created by the “rather damnable e-mails”: “They insinuate guilt.
205
They suggest it. They’re simply badly written.” According to the judge, the emails gave the impression that the admiral was more concerned with public
relations and the reaction of Congress and the Pentagon than in ensuring that
Owens got a fair trial. “This is almost like a trial by . . . public affairs,” he said.
He concluded, however, that the superintendent had not intended to taint the
jury pool. The judge denied the defense motion, although he gave the defense an
additional two peremptory challenges. During the subsequent jury selection, the
jury was whittled down to the minimum allowable size of five jurors. Because a
guilty verdict requires agreement of at least two-thirds of the jury, the
prosecution needed four out of five jurors to convict, rather than the four out of

199. Earl Kelly, Taped Call Allowed in Owens Rape Case, CAPITAL (Annapolis), July 15, 2006, at A1.
200. Bradley Olson, Navy Wants Mid Gone: Academy Moves to Expel Former Star Quarterback
Acquitted of Rape, BALT. SUN, Feb. 14, 2007, at 1A.
201. Id. As a consequence of negotiations between the Academy and Owens, Owens will not be
required to repay his tuition even if the Secretary upholds the expulsion.
202. Steve Vogel, Superintendent Faulted over Rape Case E-Mails, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at B4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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six that would have been required if not for the additional peremptory
206
challenges granted the defense.
Had the case been tried without a jury, the trial would have been
substantially shorter. After the cross-examination of the accuser, the judge stated
that Weingarten had “eviscerated the alleged victim” and “took her apart like a
207
Swiss watch,” and that, if it had been a judge-only trial, he would have
208
dismissed the case at that point.
One thing that is not clear from the record is what the result of the Article
32 hearing was. After that hearing in early March 2006, the presiding officer
made a recommendation to Admiral Rempt as to whether Owens should be
court-martialed. In late April, the Academy announced that Owens would face a
209
court-martial. It declined to say, however, what the recommendation coming
out of the Article 32 hearing had been, leaving open the possibility that Rempt
ignored a recommendation not to proceed by general court-martial.
The view that the prosecution of Owens was politically motivated was
widely shared. After his acquittal, an editorial in the Annapolis newspaper The
Capital argued:
We don’t know if the superintendent got bad advice from the attorneys or if he
decided to make an example of Midshipman Owens, the former quarterback of
the Navy football team. But now that Midshipman Owens has been acquitted of
rape, we believe he has suffered enough. If his accuser ends up with the
commission that [Owens] deserves, then the worst miscarriage of justice is yet to
210
come.

A few days after Owens’ trial ended, Admiral Rempt is reported to have
confirmed his political motivation. Explaining privately to a small group of
alumni why he pursued charges against Owens, he is reported to have said, “I
had no choice; if I did not, we’d have every feminist group and the ACLU after
211
us.” If that story is accurate, it is an appalling indictment of the admiral.
E. A Lack of Balance
The final point raised in the editorial quoted above—that a gross
miscarriage of justice would occur if the accuser ended up receiving the
commission that Owens deserved—hints at a common injustice in these cases.
The accused is often acquitted of criminal wrongdoing but then punished
administratively for it, while the accuser, who may have violated the same rules

206. Bradley Olson, Five Are Chosen to Decide Fate of Midshipman: Potential Jurors Questioned about
Views on Alcohol Use, Sexual Abuse in Rape Case Against Owens, BALT. SUN, July 11, 2006, at 2B.
207. Earl Kelly, Taped Call Allowed in Owens Rape Case, CAPITAL (Annapolis), July 15, 2006, at A1.
208. Annie Linskey & Bradley Olson, Owens’ Lawyer Tops in Corporate Defense: Rape Case Outside
the Norm for Weingarten, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2006, at 1B.
209. Olson, Navy Trial in Rape Case, supra note 193.
210. Editorial, Our View: Academy Can Help Dispel Cloud from Rape Case, CAPITAL (Annapolis),
July 30, 2006, at A8.
211. Earl Kelly, Naval Academy Grads Take up Owens’ Cause, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Oct. 6, 2006, at
B1.
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as the accused, gets off unscathed because of immunity given her in exchange
for her testimony or because of policies of “amnesty.” Addressing this issue in
the context of the investigation of sexual assaults at the Air Force Academy, the
Pentagon Inspector General observed that this imbalance in treatment is
212
“contrary to fundamental fairness.”
In the Owens case, the accuser and her witnesses had been granted
immunity for numerous violations, including under-age drinking, drinking in
Bancroft Hall, maintaining a party house off base, abusing prescription
painkillers, having sex in Bancroft Hall, drinking on guard duty, being absent
from the guard post, and sexual assault (it seems the accuser had grabbed a
213
male midshipman’s genitals in a bar). Thus, even if the sexual intercourse
between Owens and the accuser was consensual, Owens can still be expelled for
having sex in Bancroft Hall—but his accuser cannot. Moreover, his name has
been dragged through the mud, and he will carry around the burden of this
accusation for the rest of his life, but the accuser’s name, in contrast, was
carefully protected and her confessions of wrongdoing do not go into her
record.
Such inequities can occur even in the absence of immunity. For example,
several years ago, a male-female pair of Naval Academy midshipmen was
214
found in the woman’s room “after a long night of drinking and socializing.”
The man admitted to having consensual sex; the woman contended that she was
heavily intoxicated that night and had no memory of having sex with the man,
but that she “suspected” that maybe she had been sexually assaulted. Because
Academy rules forbid sex on campus, the man was expelled. The woman, by
denying having engaged in consensual sex, had admitted no wrongdoing and
therefore was not prosecuted. The man found himself working in a warehouse
to pay off the $76,000 he owed the Navy to reimburse it for education costs, and
the woman graduated to the fleet. As recognized by the Pentagon Inspector
General in its report on the Air Force Academy investigation, the draconian
punishment imposed for engaging in consensual sexual activity—repayment of
tuition and termination of a military career—coupled with amnesty for the
215
accuser, creates a strong incentive for false claims of sexual assault.
Whether Lamar Owens was actually guilty of rape, only he knows. Even
the accuser may not know, if her claims of blacked-out memory are to be
believed. But one thing is clear: There was simply no way, on this evidence, that
a reasonable jury could conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Owens was
guilty. That should have been apparent to the prosecutors at least by the time of
the Article 32 hearing, when the accuser “supposed” that she might have
consented to intercourse but had been too drunk to remember. To bring criminal
charges against a person to appease a political constituency is unconscionable.

212. OIG, EVALUATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 165, at 3.
213. Earl Kelly, Judge Blasts Prosecution in Owens’ Trial, CAPITAL (Annapolis), July 14, 2006, at A1;
Countervailing Force, Duke on the Severn: Lamar Owens Testimonial Immunity, July 22, 2006,
http://pcrevolt.blogspot.com/2006_07_01_archive.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
214. David Brown, Danzig Seals Midshipman’s Expulsion, NAVY TIMES, June 21, 1999, at 17.
215. OIG, EVALUATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 165, at 3.
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To pursue them once the possibility of conviction has evaporated is even worse.
Yet if Admiral Rempt pursued the case to appease Academy critics, as he
apparently acknowledged, that is precisely what happened.
CONCLUSION
The seemingly endless parade of sexual scandals—just a few of which were
reviewed in this essay—is a predictable, if not inevitable, consequence of mixing
the sexes together in the often intimate and cloistered environments in which
military personnel operate. When they occur, the typical response has been to
label men as “predators” and women as “victims,” to impose often draconian
punishments, and to increase the amount of diversity and sexual-harassment
training.
The military’s goal of “zero tolerance” for everything sexual is misguided
for a number of reasons. First, it tends to mask the distinction between serious
and trivial offenses, as exhibited in the case of Bryan Black. Second, it creates
self-imposed pressure to pursue even weak cases, such as that of Lamar Owens.
One can believe that rape is a serious offense and at the same time think that a
given case is too weak to pursue. Third, the zero-tolerance mentality tends to
suggest that “zero” is the appropriate target level for the various offenses. But
that is not a broadly applicable position. Murder and rape occur in the civilian
world, and the criminal justice system deals with them as best it can, but we do
not go around talking about having “zero tolerance” for murder and rape, nor
do we go looking for some institutional failure when they happen. Most
prosecutors do not think that they have to prosecute somebody every time a
crime occurs, and when they succumb to the temptations of over-reaching, they
216
are roundly criticized for it. Any given murder or rape is “unacceptable” in the
sense of its being something that society condemns, but it is not necessarily an
indicator that something is unacceptably wrong with the system. This is not to
suggest that sexual assault and sexual harassment are not bad things or that the
military should not take reasonable steps to reduce their frequency. No one
argues that or, presumably, even thinks it. The problem is not that these
problems are trivial; the problem instead arises from the “witch-hunt” mentality
that so often takes over when these issues come up.
Sexual transgressions in the military are not going to go away. They have
not gone away in the civilian sector, and the forced intimacy of military life
virtually guarantees that they will persist in the military at even more intense
levels. The prolonged separation of military personnel from their families
increases the likelihood of straying from vows of fidelity. Moreover, the natural
attraction that men have for young women, combined with the natural
217
attraction that women have for high-status men, means that temptations for
fraternization are always going to be high. At one extreme, this attraction results

216. See, e.g., Sylvia Adcock, New Ethics Allegations in Prosecution at Duke: Bar Says DA Lied,
Withheld Evidence, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2007, at A3.
217. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Sex, Power, and Dominance: The Evolutionary Psychology of
Sexual Harassment, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 145 (2006).
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in sexual coercion or sexual bribery. At the other, it results in feelings only and
no sexual behavior. In either event, it has consequences.
The core lesson that the military and its civilian overseers need to take to
heart is this: extraordinary attempts to “help” women ultimately harm their
position within the military. Military women are not helped when false charges
of sexual assault are overlooked, as in the Elizabeth Warnick/Cole Cowden
Tailhook incident. It does military women no favor to insulate them from the
same punishment that they would receive if they were men, as in the Kelly Flinn
incident. Military women are not going to gain acceptance by men when men
know that women can give them the “Bryan Black treatment” if they say the
wrong thing. As long as there are military women like the ones who demanded
high-level action against Lt. Bryan Black and Capt. Ernie Blanchard—women
who apparently view it as their charge in life to root out any arguable sexism
and take it to the highest level—military men will not trust military women.
Period.
The treatment of military sex scandals is but one example of a more general
problem presented by a sexually integrated military. For a variety of reasons,
both the military and its civilian overseers have been reluctant to hold women to
218
the same standards to which they hold men. The result has been widespread
application of double standards coupled with a climate that imperils the careers
of those having the temerity to point out the existence of those standards. This
protectionism toward women likely derives from the same protective impulse
that men are likely to feel toward women in battle. In that context, advocates of
sexual integration generally deny any special tendency (or responsibility) of
men to protect women, while in the context of sexual issues within the military,
they demand it. Ultimately, a decision must be made: Can women take care of
themselves, or can’t they?
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